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DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN?
THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE AND
ENTITY LAW CONVERGENCE PATTERNS
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
Matthew G. Doré *
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The internal affairs rule is probably the most well-established choiceof-law principle in American corporate law. This rule holds that the law
governing a corporation’s internal matters, like shareholder/management
relations, is the law of the state/country where the corporation is organized. 1
As an example, a corporation may incorporate in Delaware, thereby
adopting Delaware’s corporate governance rules, and at the same time
locate its company headquarters and conduct all business elsewhere. The
internal affairs rule stands in marked contrast to the real seat choice-of-law
doctrine that continental European countries have traditionally applied in
the field of company (corporate) law. Under the latter approach, a business
entity must organize itself under the company law of its “real seat”
jurisdiction. The company’s real seat is the state/country where the
company’s administrative headquarters—its nerve center—and presumably
its center of interest is located. 2
Because the internal affairs rule permits business managers to select the
incorporating jurisdiction based on corporate governance considerations
alone, it is generally agreed that the rule facilitates a market for corporate
laws across the United States. 3 Scholars from a variety of perspectives have
long argued that Delaware dominates this market, and that Delaware’s
dominance has in turn triggered a convergence of state corporate laws
around permissive approaches to corporate governance that impose
relatively few constraints on shareholders, managers, and other corporate

* Richard M. & Anita Calkins Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake University.
1. See generally FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.2 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining

the internal affairs rule); see also infra notes 8–18 and accompanying text.
2. See generally Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate
Laws, 36 INT’L LAW. 1015 (2002) (explaining the real seat doctrine); see also infra notes 27–30
and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 662 (“Because of the [internal affairs doctrine], states can compete to
supply corporate law separate from tax law, regulatory law, or other benefits. To obtain tax and
other benefits in a particular state, a corporation might need to locate a plant or other assets in that
particular state. By incorporating in a different state, the corporation can choose among the
particular beneficial aspects of each state’s laws. Without the [internal affairs doctrine], the
corporation would be forced to choose a single state’s bundle of laws, including corporate, tax,
and regulatory law.”); see also infra notes 4 and 21–25.
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participants. 4 In contrast, because the real seat doctrine precludes a business
from choosing a jurisdiction for its company law without also locating
company headquarters there, European countries have historically been
insulated from significant company law competition 5 and have imposed
more mandates relating to corporate governance than their U.S.
counterparts. 6 Contemporary developments in both Europe and the United
States provide an interesting opportunity to consider, from a comparative
perspective, whether these traditional patterns still hold. That is the purpose
of this Article.
Part I describes recent changes in European Union (EU) case law that
have effectively replaced continental Europe’s real seat doctrine with the
internal affairs rule. Part I also explains related EU legislative developments
that make it easier for existing companies within the European Union to
change their governing law. As Part II then shows, despite a number of
predictions to the contrary, these EU changes have thus far failed to
produce significant jurisdictional competition or convergence in the field of
European company law, and no “Delaware of Europe” has emerged.
Part III of the Article contrasts the European developments with nearly
contemporaneous changes made to U.S. business association laws. In a
remarkably short period of time during the early 1990s, U.S. unincorporated
business association laws changed and converged dramatically as all
jurisdictions rapidly enacted new laws authorizing limited liability
companies (LLCs) and limited liability partnerships (LLPs). These novel
unincorporated entity laws emerged and converged around common
denominators across the country before it became clear that the internal
affairs rule applied to them.

4. For example, nearly forty years ago, Professor William Cary and Judge Ralph Winter
argued from opposing perspectives concerning the merits of Delaware law, yet both hypothesized
that competitive pressures from Delaware had caused most states to adopt similar corporation
codes. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 664–66 (1974) (describing the early history of New Jersey and Delaware’s
competition for corporate charters and Delaware’s emergence as a leading source of American
corporate law); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258 (1977) (arguing that investors favor Delaware because
its corporate laws enhance shareholder value); see also William J. Carney, The Political Economy
of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 303 (1997) (arguing that the
“common market” in corporate laws that has long prevailed in the United States has produced
corporate laws that provide relatively less regulation than their European counterparts).
5. See, e.g., Hanne S. Birkmose, A Market for Company Incorporations in the European
Union—Is Überseering the Beginning of the End?, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 55, 56 (2005)
(stating that under the real seat doctrine, jurisdictional competition in European business
association laws has been “impossible and unwanted”); Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in
European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 477, 479 (2004) (“[T]he ability of corporations to
choose the applicable corporate law regime has long faced a formidable obstacle in the so-called
real seat doctrine.”).
6. See Carney, supra note 4.
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If the internal affairs rule and jurisdictional competition are key drivers
of change and convergence of business association laws, one would expect
different results than those described above. With competitive forces
unleashed by a new EU internal affairs rule, company laws across Europe
should have changed and converged around permissive corporate
governance models that are more efficient than traditional European
approaches. In the United States, where it was unclear whether the internal
affairs rule applied to LLCs and LLPs, and where there had previously been
little or no jurisdictional competition in the unincorporated business
association field, business owners and jurisdictions should have been slow
to embrace the novel entities.
Part IV argues that the actual results support nuanced theories of
jurisdictional competition and entity law convergence that have recently
been advanced as alternatives to prevailing “market for corporate law”
theories. These nuanced views recognize that convergence of business
association laws (or not) is likely influenced by a variety of idiosyncratic
factors, including forces that naturally resist efficiency-based convergence
trends. At the same time, business association laws may converge for
reasons other than economic efficiency. The failure of European company
laws to converge despite new possibilities for jurisdictional competition
within the European Union is an excellent example of the first
phenomenon, while the rapid convergence of U.S. unincorporated business
association laws illustrates the second. In sum, we should not be surprised
that it has not been “déjà vu all over again” 7 as the internal affairs rule takes
root in Europe and in new unincorporated business association settings in
the United States. As explained in the Article’s concluding section, we
should instead use these disparate experiences as new opportunities to learn
from comparative study in the business association law field.
I. THE U.S. INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE, THE EUROPEAN REAL
SEAT DOCTRINE, AND RECENT EU CHANGES
This Part of the Article briefly explains the internal affairs rule and the
real seat doctrine, the competing choice-of-law approaches that have
respectively governed American corporate law, and the company law of
continental Europe since the mid-nineteenth century. This Part also explains
how, over the past dozen years, European Court of Justice decisions
construing the EU Treaty have dramatically limited EU Member States’
ability to adhere to the real seat doctrine. These decisions, along with other
legal developments in the European Union, now effectively require
European countries to apply the internal affairs rule when resolving

7. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 30 (1998) (describing Mickey Mantle and Roger Maris
repeatedly hitting back-to-back home runs in the early 1960s).
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corporate choice-of-law questions, and thereby make competition and
convergence in the field of European company law a real possibility.
A. THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE
Like other legal persons in the United States, a corporation is subject to
the laws of any state in which it conducts business. If the laws of more than
one jurisdiction potentially apply to a dispute that involves the corporation,
like a contract or tort lawsuit with multi-state dimensions, ordinary choiceof-law principles determine which law controls. 8 Since at least the 1860s,
however, a unique choice-of-law rule has traditionally applied to corporate
governance questions. 9 The “internal affairs” rule dictates that the law of
the jurisdiction where the corporation is organized should control these
legal issues. 10 For example, legal problems relating to a corporation’s
issuance of stock, rules governing shareholder voting, fiduciary duties of
management, dissolution procedures, and the like are all resolved using the
corporate law of the state of incorporation, even if another jurisdiction has a
more significant relationship to the corporation or persons litigating the
issues. 11
When a U.S. corporation conducts business outside of its incorporation
jurisdiction, the corporation must comply with “foreign corporation”
registration requirements (a process sometimes called “qualifying to do
business”) in any state where the corporation establishes a sufficient
jurisdictional presence. 12 But registration as a foreign corporation does not
change the internal affairs rule. In the qualifying state, as elsewhere, the
foreign corporation’s internal governance matters are still controlled by the
law of its state of incorporation. 13 In fact, a corporation may incorporate in
one jurisdiction in order to take advantage of its corporate law but conduct
most (or all) of the corporation’s business elsewhere as a “pseudo-foreign”
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 (1971) (“The rights and liabilities
of a corporation with respect to a third person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can
likewise be done by an individual are determined by the same choice-of-law principles as are
applicable to non-corporate parties.”); see also WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91 (3d ed. 2002) (“[I]f the problem centers around
corporate responsibility to others (a breach of contract claim, for example), then the normal or
otherwise applicable choice-of-law rules govern.”).
9. Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Rule, 32 J. CORP. L.
33, 44 (2006) (stating that “courts first began to articulate the doctrine in the 1860s”).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (providing that, except in unusual
cases, “the local law of the state of incorporation” determines “[i]ssues involving the rights and
liabilities of a corporation, other than those dealt with in § 301”).
11. See id. cmt. a. A few states decline to apply the internal affairs rule in certain cases. See
infra note 14.
12. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.01 (1984) (requiring foreign corporations that
“transact business” in the state to obtain a certificate of authority—a process often referred to as
“qualifying to do business” in a state).
13. Id. § 15.05 (“This Act does not authorize this state to regulate the organization or internal
affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state.”).
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corporation—a corporation that is foreign where its principal place of
business is located, but only because the corporation happens to be
incorporated under a different state’s law. 14 Many corporations chartered in
Delaware fit this description.
There are a number of justifications for the internal affairs rule, which
now applies not only to corporations but also to other U.S. business
associations that are formed under a particular state’s laws. 15 The rule
vindicates the choice-of-law preferences of those who organize the business
and offers uniform legal treatment to its participants. 16 As the Supreme
Court has observed, application of a single body of law to internal
governance questions provides “certainty and predictability of result” and
protects “the justified expectations of parties with interests in [the business
organization].” 17 The internal affairs rule also reduces the possibility of
inconsistent regulation of governance issues, and thus has constitutional
dimensions. 18
Although there is strong policy support for the internal affairs rule,
there are competing views about its merits, as discussed in more detail in
the concluding section of this Article.19 There are also competing views
about the “markets” for corporate law (to use law and economics
terminology) 20 and the corporate law convergence patterns that the internal
affairs rule apparently produces. For example, scholars agree that the rule
permits corporate managers to shop across jurisdictions for favorable
corporate law, but there is disagreement about the precise dynamics and
character of the resulting law markets. 21 There is also debate about whether
14. A few states (e.g., California) have enacted statutes that purport to regulate certain
corporate governance issues for foreign corporations whose business and stockholders have strong
connections to the state. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2010) (providing that various
parts of the California Corporations Code apply to a foreign corporation if more than fifty percent
of its corporate income, property, and payroll factors are based in California and more than fifty
percent of the corporation’s voting stock is owned by Californians, with exceptions for public
corporations). Conflict of law scholars have noted that “[s]uch regulation raises questions
concerning constitutional limitations on choice of law.” See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note
8, at 293 n.10.
15. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 901 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 254 (2008) (stating that the law
of the state where the limited partnership is organized governs the partnership’s internal affairs).
16. See Tung, supra note 9, at 40 (stating that, for corporations, the internal affairs rule
“vindicates corporate managers’ and shareholders’ choice of governing law” and “offers uniform
treatment of all shareholders”).
17. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983).
18. See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 8, §§ 97–99 (discussing various
provisions in the Constitution that may limit the application of choice-of-law rules).
19. See infra notes 224–235 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 3 (explaining the market for corporate law theory).
21. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (2009) (arguing that jurisdictional competition in American corporate law should be
characterized as a triangular contest running on two sides between Delaware and all other states,
and on the third side between Delaware and the U.S. government, which makes corporate law for
public companies through securities regulation).
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the competition that occurs in such markets is beneficial. The most famous
dispute, now forty years old, ran between the late Professor William Cary
and Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr. Cary contended that the internal affairs rule
fuels a competitive race to the bottom that pressures states to forgo
desirable corporate governance regulation, whereas Winter described a race
to the top that forces states to enact corporate laws that maximize
shareholder value. 22
One thing is clear: the content of corporate laws has converged across
the United States. Most states’ corporation laws are now substantially
similar in substance, if not style, to the Delaware General Corporation Law
or the ABA’s Model Business Corporation Act. 23 Law and economics
scholars like Professor Roberta Romano contend that this corporate law
convergence is a byproduct of the internal affairs rule and resulting state
law competition, and that such competition produces the most efficient and
desirable levels of corporate regulation. 24 Other scholars make similar
claims about global corporate law convergence patterns. Professor Franklin
Gevurtz has summarized these arguments as follows:
Corporations are in constant competition with each other and, in a global
economy, this means competition with corporations from other countries.
Corporations operating with less efficient corporate laws and structures
will be at a disadvantage in this competition.
....
[C]apital will gravitate toward companies organized under more efficient
laws and institutions. This means that more new, or more vibrant and
growing companies will be formed under efficient laws and institutions,
gradually replacing or rendering less relevant the aging or smaller
companies that were formed under less efficient laws and institutions.
Also, the greater tax base provided by companies formed under more
efficient laws and institutions will lead governments to change less
22. See Cary, supra note 4; Winter, supra note 4; see also Curtis Alva, Delaware and the
Market for Corporate Charters, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 890–95 (1990) (describing the
competing views of Professors William L. Cary, Roberta Romano, and Jonathan R. Macey and
Geoffrey P. Miller).
23. As noted in the text, the Delaware General Corporation Law has long had a major
influence on U.S. corporation law. The Model Business Corporation Act has also had a significant
impact. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2:5 (3d ed. 2010)
(noting that “the Model Act was intended not to become a uniform corporation law but rather to
serve as a drafting guide for the states” and that “[e]ventually, the Model Act became the pattern
for large parts of the corporation statutes in most states”). A recent article has used the phrase
“constructive symbiosis” to describe the process of drafting and amending both the Model
Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law over a period of many
decades. See Jeffrey M. Gorris et al., Delaware Corporate Law and the Model Business
Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 (2011).
24. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 147 (1993) (“The
genius of American corporate law . . . is that the dynamics of state competition reduces the
number of extraneous regulations that must be bypassed.”).
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efficient laws and institutions. Along similar lines, the greater interests of
those who profit more from corporations operating under efficient laws
and institutions will eventually place more pressure on governments to
adopt such laws and institutions than the pressure governments feel from
those who profit, but less in the aggregate, from inefficient laws and
25
institutions.

Perhaps the strongest claim, made more than a decade ago by Professors
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, is that the “end of history” for
corporate law will be marked by global convergence of corporate
governance systems around a single, standard shareholder-centered model
of the corporation that is more efficient and cost-effective than competing
state- or stakeholder-oriented models of the corporation. 26
B. THE REAL SEAT DOCTRINE
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, several key jurisdictions in
continental Europe departed from the “state of incorporation” theory, as the
internal affairs rule is known there, and began to follow instead what is now
called the “real seat” doctrine.27 Under this choice-of-law rule, sometimes
called siege réel or siege social in France or sitztheorie in Germany, a
company must be organized under the laws of the country where its real
seat—its administrative or management headquarters—is located. 28 As one
writer explains,
the main philosophy behind [the real seat doctrine] is that a company must
be subject to the law of the state in which its corporate centre of gravity is
located. This is because it is assumed that the majority of the corporate
stakeholders will be located there. Such stakeholders include shareholders,
creditors, employees, and suppliers. It is also assumed that societal
interests are best served when a company is subject to the law of the state
29
where its central administration is located.

25. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a NeverEnding Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 494–95 & nn.109–15 (2011). As discussed below, (see
text accompanying notes 185–188), Professor Gevurtz does not necessarily subscribe to the views
of the scholars whose work he summarizes in the quoted textual material.
26. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439 (2001). The authors cite the corporate laws of postwar France and Japan as examples of
state-oriented corporate laws where the government “play[ed] a strong direct role in the affairs of
large business firms.” Id. at 446–47. They cite Germany’s corporate laws, which provide for labor
representation on the boards of some companies, as a variant of stakeholder-oriented corporate
law. Id. at 445–46, 449.
27. See generally Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 66 YALE L.J. 137, 166–70
(1955) (describing the real seat doctrine as a response by France and Belgium to the loss of
chartering business to England, which functioned as the Delaware of Europe in the second half of
the nineteenth century).
28. See Ebke, supra note 2, at 1015–17.
29. Birkmose, supra note 5, at 67–68.
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The real seat doctrine is enforced in several ways. First, a company
organized in a country other than that of its real seat is not recognized as a
legal entity in the real seat jurisdiction. Non-recognition disables the
company from using the courts of the real seat jurisdiction to assert or
protect its legal rights; it also puts the company’s owners at risk of personal
liability there as de facto partners. 30 In addition, if a company is initially
organized where its real seat is located but tries to relocate the company
seat to another jurisdiction without also reincorporating there, the country in
which the company was originally organized might treat the transfer of the
real seat as an involuntary dissolution/liquidation of the company,
triggering potentially adverse tax consequences.31
So long as the real seat doctrine prevailed in continental Europe,32 there
was little prospect for regulatory competition or convergence in the field of
European company law. 33 This situation persisted even after the advent of
the European Union and the promulgation of several company law
“harmonization” directives that required Member States to conform
portions of their company law to EU standards. 34 The directives did not

30. See id. at 69–71 (explaining the various consequences that could follow for a company that
organizes and operates across borders without regard to the real seat doctrine).
31. Id. at 70; see also Benjamin Angelette, Note, The Revolution That Never Came and the
Revolution Coming—De Lasteyrie Du Salliant, Marks & Spencer, Sevic Systems and the
Changing Corporate Laws in Europe, 92 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (2006).
32. See Dammann, supra note 5, at 479 n.9 (listing Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain as countries that apply some form of the real seat
doctrine, and Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as
countries following the incorporation theory); see also Ebke, supra note 2, at 1016 (stating that the
real seat doctrine “is applied in one form or another by the majority of the Member States of the
[European Union]”); Nicole Rothe, Comment, Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within
the European Union: An Analysis of the European Court of Justice Decision in the Überseering
Case, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2004) (“Germany, France, Italy, and Spain[] adhere to the
real seat doctrine, while the Netherlands, Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark follow the
incorporation theory.”).
33. See supra note 5; see also Carney, supra note 4, at 317–18 (describing European company
law as follows: “The evidence . . . is consistent with the development of interest group bargains
prior to the elimination of trade barriers . . . .”); Didier Martin & Forrest G. Alogna, A European
Delaware: The Nascent Regulatory Market in Europe, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
FINANCIER, Dec. 2007, at 4, 4–5 (“In continental Europe, the real seat . . . doctrine has historically
been a strong barrier to a European market for corporate charters.”).
34. EU lawmakers have attempted to harmonize key aspects of Member States’ company law
(and other laws of Member States) through mandatory EU directives that are to be implemented
through national law reforms. See Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Community
Experience for Developing Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT’L L. 485, 536–37 (1993)
(explaining process of harmonization). But as one paper explains, in the field of company law the
harmonization process has “reinforced the non-competition equilibrium among the [M]ember
[S]tates.” William W. Bratton et al., How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking: A
Comparative Analysis, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 353 (2009); see also Luca Enriques, EC Company
Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 8 (2006)
(arguing that the European Union’s corporate law harmonization program has had little impact on
core aspects of European corporations’ governance and management).
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preempt Member States’ ability to regulate company board structure,35 or to
protect employee interests through company law co-determination
requirements—a mandate that labor interests be represented in the
management of large companies 36—or to include gender equity standards in
company law. 37 Nor did the directives prevent Member States from
imposing minimum capital requirements that exceeded those provided in
the directives 38 or their own “wrongful trading” liability standards on
directors who failed to declare their company insolvent in a timely
fashion. 39 Some EU Member States, notably the United Kingdom, had
relatively relaxed standards on one or more of these issues or refused to
impose such requirements on companies organized there.40 However, the
real seat doctrine prevented European businesses from taking advantage of
more flexible foreign company laws and effectively insulated other EU
Member States from competition in the field of company law, whether from
the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 41
C. ECJ DECISIONS LIMITING THE REAL SEAT DOCTRINE AND EU
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS EXPANDING COMPANY MOBILITY
Starting in 1999, a series of European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions
began to curb application of the real seat doctrine pursuant to EU Treaty
articles 43 and 48. These “freedom of establishment” provisions of the
Treaty prohibit Member States from imposing “restrictions on the freedom
of establishment of nationals of [other] Member State[s]” in their territory,
35. Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate Law in the European Union, 31
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 377, 389 (1998) (“Within the European Union, there are various models for
the administration of stock corporations.”).
36. See Jens C. Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 51, 89 n.165 (2005) (“Several Member States, including Germany, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden, have adopted statutes that govern
codetermination for employees on supervisory and management boards.”).
37. See JUSTIN BORG-BARTHET, THE GOVERNING LAW OF COMPANIES IN EU LAW 69 (2011)
(noting that “a number of European states have adopted laws to bring about equal representation
of each gender in the boards of certain companies”).
38. See Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case
Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165, 1174 (2001) (noting that
“many Member States go beyond the Second Directive’s legal capital rules, providing for a
stricter regime intended to better protect creditors”).
39. See Gabriele Apfelbacher, The German Corporate Governance Code, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE, at 591 (2002)
(noting that “the details [of European wrongful trading laws] vary considerably”).
40. See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation Versus Regulatory
Competition 21 (Inst. for Law & Fin., Working Paper No. 41, 2005), available at http://www.ilffrankfurt.de/uploads/media/ILF_WP_041.pdf (“[D]espite the early harmonisation efforts, many
feel that the UK’s company law still has a substantially more flexible character than the company
laws of many other European jurisdictions.”).
41. See Carney, supra note 4, at 318 (describing post-EU company law in Member States as
characterized by “effective interest group resistance to competitive forces once a common market
was created”).
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including “the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries.” 42 The right
of freedom of establishment extends not only to natural persons, but also to
“[c]ompanies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State and having their registered office, central administration or principal
place of business within the [European Union].” 43 Three ECJ cases
applying these Treaty provisions in the field of company law are
particularly noteworthy.
A 1999 decision, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 44 was
the opening salvo. The ECJ held that Danish citizens who organized a U.K.
company for the sole purpose of doing all of its business in Denmark, and
who chose the U.K. entity in order to evade Denmark’s minimum capital
requirements for domestic companies, were nonetheless entitled to register
the U.K. company to do business in Denmark. 45 Denmark’s refusal to
register the company, the ECJ held, violated the company’s right to
freedom of establishment under the Treaty. 46 Denmark had defended its
refusal on public interest grounds—protection of creditors—but the ECJ
held that other means less burdensome to fundamental EU Treaty freedoms,
like disclosure in Denmark of the company’s status as a U.K. entity, were
available for that purpose.47

42. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002,
O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002), ch. 2, art. 43. Article 43 EC provides:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be
prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies,
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any
Member State.

Id.

43. Article 48 EC extends the freedom of establishment to business entities:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community
shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are
nationals of Member States.

Id. art. 48.
44. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459.
45. Id. para. 39.
46. Id. para. 30.
47. The court concluded that Denmark’s refusal of company registration in order to protect its
minimum capital standards did not satisfy the four conditions necessary for national measures that
hinder the exercise of fundamental Treaty freedoms. As noted by the court, according to the
standards laid down in its Cassis de Dijon decision, such measures “must be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest;
they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.” Id. para. 34.
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The next landmark decision, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction
Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 48 came in 2002. Überseering was a
Dutch company that had been acquired by German nationals who moved its
headquarters to Düsseldorf. 49 Thereafter, Überseering brought suit in
Germany against Nordic, a German company, as a result of a construction
dispute. The German court concluded that Überseering had no capacity to
sue in Germany because the company’s real seat had been transferred there
when German nationals acquired ownership of its shares and relocated the
company’s central administration to Düsseldorf. 50 The real seat doctrine
required reincorporation of Überseering in Germany at that point, but the
company had not done so. 51 The ECJ disagreed, holding that the German
court was wrong to refuse Überseering access to German courts because
Treaty articles 43 and 48 required Germany to recognize both Überseering’s
legal capacity as a Dutch company (despite the relocation of the company’s
real seat to Germany) and the company’s right to sue in Germany. 52
The ECJ further enhanced EU companies’ freedom of establishment
rights in Kamer Van Koophandel en Fabrieken Voor Amersterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., 53 a 2003 case testing whether the Netherlands could
impose special requirements on a U.K. company organized by Dutch
nationals for the purpose of doing business in the Netherlands. Dutch
corporate law recognized the right of such a pseudo-foreign company to
conduct business there but conditioned that right on the company’s
compliance with certain requirements of Dutch company law (e.g.,
provisions regarding share capital) that were intended to protect creditors.54
The ECJ held that the Netherlands could not so condition recognition of the
foreign company without infringing the EU Treaty’s freedom of
establishment principles. 55
Scholars now agree that the ECJ’s expansive interpretation of business
entities’ rights to freedom of establishment under the EU Treaty in Centros,
Überseering, and Inspire Art has considerably diminished the impact of the
real seat doctrine in the European Union, especially for newly formed
companies. 56 As one writer puts it, “The net effect [of the three decisions] is
48. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC),
2002 E.C.R. I-9919.
49. Id. para. 7.
50. Id. paras. 9–10.
51. Id.
52. Id. para. 94.
53. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amersterdam v. Inspire Art
Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155.
54. Id. paras. 22–33.
55. Id. paras. 97–98, 101. As in both Centros and Überseering, the ECJ rejected arguments in
Inspire Art that interference with freedom of establishment was justified to protect the public
interest. Id.
56. See, e.g., Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 374 (“The ECJ decisions in Centros, Überseering
and Inspire Art make it possible for new [EU] firms to migrate to more favorable jurisdictions.”);
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the importation of the American internal affairs doctrine which requires that
the only state which is entitled to regulate the organisation of companies is
the state under whose laws the company is incorporated.” 57
Concurrently with these EU case law developments, changes in other
EU laws created additional possibilities for existing companies to
reorganize or move across Member State lines.58 These new EU rules
include a cross-border merger directive that forbids EU Member States
from restricting merger transactions to domestic entities.59 EU legislation
also now authorizes creation of a “Societas Europea,” a business entity that
combines companies from two different Member States into a new
company governed primarily by only one of those States’ company laws. 60
In addition, the ECJ’s 2012 VALE ruling 61 will facilitate company
conversions from the governing law of one Member State to another.
A few important limitations on freedom of establishment still linger.
For example, EU regulatory changes designed to establish a supranational
EU incorporation option for small firms—the European Private Company—
have not yet borne fruit.62 In addition, the ECJ’s ruling in Cartesio Oktato
es Szolgaltato bt 63 suggests that barriers may remain for existing companies
that want to relocate to a new EU jurisdiction. Cartesio permits an EU
Member State to condition the continued existence of a company formed
under its laws on the company’s maintenance of a real seat in the
jurisdiction.64 Because a company must legally exist in order to invoke its
Angelette, supra note 31, at 1221 (“The Court’s interpretation of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC
Treaty threatens to make the place of central administration wholly irrelevant for corporate law
purposes.”); Armour, supra note 40, at 13 (“Essentially, the Court ruled that as a matter of EC
law, a company, once validly formed under the laws of any Member State, becomes a ‘person’
and is consequently entitled to exercise the Treaty Freedoms.”); Birkmose, supra note 5, at 106
(“There is no doubt that the ECJ has radically changed the corporate landscape in the last five
years.”); see also Christoph Allmendinger, Company Law in the European Union and the United
States: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of the EU Freedoms of Establishment and Capital
and the U.S. Interstate Commerce Clause, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 67, 103 (2013) (stating
that “it has to be concluded that the ECJ’s interpretation of the Freedoms of Establishment and
Capital limits the powers to regulate company law at the state level more severely than does the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause”).
57. BORG-BARTHET, supra note 37, at 122.
58. See Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 358–66 (discussing both the EU’s Cross-Border
Merger Directive and the SE Regulation).
59. Council Directive 2005/56/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1.
60. Commission Regulation 2157/201, para. 7, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC).
61. Case C-378/10, VALE Epitesi kft, 2012 E.C.R. I-0000 (holding that there is an
impermissible restriction on freedom of establishment under EC Treaty Articles 49 and 54 when
national legislation of a Member State allows a domestic company to convert into another
domestic business entity but does not allow a company organized under another Member State’s
law to so convert); see also Justin Borg-Barthet, Free at Last? Choice of Corporate Law in the EU
Following the Judgment in VALE, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 503 (2013).
62. See Jaap Barneveld, Will the European Private Company See Daylight After All?, Post No.
40, DEFINING TENSION (May 30, 2011) (on file with author).
63. Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-09641.
64. Id. para. 124.
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rights to free establishment under the EU Treaty, this qualification on exit
rights may limit some existing companies’ ability to relocate unless they
reorganize as a new company in the destination Member State.65 Finally,
whether or not obstacles to relocation exist under Cartesio, tax laws may
yet impede cross-border relocations in the European Union. 66
II. COMPETING PREDICTIONS AND EVIDENCE CONCERNING
THE EFFECT OF THE DEMISE OF THE REAL SEAT
DOCTRINE AND RELATED EU DEVELOPMENTS
This Part of the Article describes the predictions of commentators about
whether the ECJ decisions and other EU changes described in Part I would
prompt Member States to compete in the field of company law. This Part
also describes the latest evidence on jurisdictional competition. The
evidence shows that, to date, there has been scant competition and only
limited change and convergence in European company law. In short, there
is no apparent Delaware effect in Europe.67
A. COMPETING PREDICTIONS
The ECJ decisions and other EU changes described in Part I naturally
prompted predictions that Member States would or should modify their
company laws to compete with other jurisdictions for company
formations. 68 For example, Professor (then-graduate student) Jens Damman
posited that to the extent the European Union embraced a free choice model
for incorporations, companies would likely migrate towards those states
that offer the “most efficient corporate law” (i.e., more permissive or lax
regulatory schemes) and that “Member States—under pressure from local
attorneys not to remain passive in the charter market—will probably engage
in a race for quality, competing with each other more vigorously than their

65. According to one recent analysis, the impact of Cartesio on exit rights depends on whether
or not the company is exiting from or migrating to a real seat state, or from or to an incorporation
theory state. See Carsten Gerner-Beuerle & Michael Schillig, The Mysteries of Freedom of
Establishment After Cartesio, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 303 (2010).
66. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 40, at 381 (noting that many EU member states impose “exit
taxes on companies which seek to relocate”); Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 371 (“Reorganizing
under a foreign corporate law statute often triggers taxes . . . .”).
67. For one discussion of the “Delaware effect,” see Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M.
Vermeulen, Does the European Company Law Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?, 11 EUR. L.J. 785,
789–91 (2005).
68. See, e.g., Birkmose, supra note 5, at 108 (“[T]here is no doubt that the ECJ has started a
process that might eventually lead to the creation of a market for company incorporations.”);
Carsten Frost, Transfer of Company’s Seat—An Unfolding Story in Europe, 36 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 359, 387 (2005) (“As a result of the ECJ decisions, the pressure on national
legislators in the EU Member States has increased to make their corporate laws more attractive to
investors.”); Martin & Alogna, supra note 33 (arguing that France should enact corporate law
reforms to attract EU businesses).
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U.S. counterparts.” 69 Many believed that the resulting competition would
trigger company law convergence across the European Union and, perhaps,
the emergence of a Delaware of Europe. 70
Some commentators disagreed that an American-style race to the
bottom (or to the top, depending on one’s perspective) would occur in
Europe. 71 Those in the latter group identified a number of disincentives,
summarized below, that might impede jurisdictional competition for
company formations within the European Union and/or convergence of
European company law.
1. Disincentives for Member State Company Law Competition
Several commentators cited Member State financial considerations as a
factor that might limit competition. For example, because EU law prevents
a Member State from collecting franchise taxes from a company whose
only connection to the Member State is that it was organized there, many
argued that chartering fees and taxes would not be a great incentive for
European jurisdictions to compete for company formations.72 Others
pointed out that if an EU Member State wanted to compete effectively in
the field of company law, the jurisdiction would have to develop not only
superior substantive company law, but also a corresponding system of
judicial expertise in the field—a difficult and expensive proposition.73

69. Dammann, supra note 5, at 543.
70. See, e.g., Angelette, supra note 31, at 1223 (noting, among other possible scenarios, that

inter-jurisdictional competition for incorporations might result in a race of laxity in EU corporate
law); Dammann, supra note 5 at 530 (“European corporations faced with the prospect of free
choice are likely to reincorporate in one or a few Member States, and it is highly probable that one
or more of the smaller Member States will emerge as the leading jurisdiction(s).”); Laura
Jankolovits, Note, No Borders. No Boundaries. No Limits: An Analysis of Corporate Law in the
European Union after the Centros Decision, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 973, 1004 (2004)
(“[T]he holding in Centros may create a race for the bottom in Europe.”).
71. See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law
Harmonization in the European Union, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 939, 947 & nn.25–27 (2006)
(arguing that “no Member State is likely to enter the market for incorporations” and listing other
authorities who concurred). As indicated in the text parenthetical, scholars disagree whether
jurisdictional competition in the field of American corporate law is beneficial. Compare Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers
from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999) (arguing that state competition likely does not
maximize shareholder wealth), with ROMANO, supra note 24, at 14–24 (arguing that state
competition benefits shareholders). See also Dammann, supra note 36, at 53 & nn.4–5 (collecting
authorities on both sides).
72. See, e.g., Birkmose, supra note 5, at 107 (stating under EU rules, “taxation seems unlikely
to be an incentive to compete for company incorporations”); Frost, supra note 68, at 379–80
(stating that “Member States do not earn significant amounts of money from incorporating
businesses”); but see Dammann, supra note 5, at 525 (offering reasons that “the European market
for corporate charters [might] not be substantially less lucrative than the U.S. market”).
73. See Dammann, supra note 5, at 532 (“Any state—large or small—interested in establishing
itself as an attractive destination for firms looking to reincorporate must make a substantial
investment in its legal and judicial services.”).
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2. Disincentives for EU Businesses to Use Foreign Company
Laws
There were also disincentives for European businesses that might want
to use another Member State’s company law. One disincentive was
uncertainty about the very existence and scope of the new EU internal
affairs rule. While there is now general agreement that the EU Treaty
requires Member States to apply the internal affairs rule to companies
organized in other European countries, when Centros and its progeny first
emerged, legal scholars did not agree on the extent to which those
decisions, and the EU Treaty freedom of establishment provisions on which
they were based, required Member States to abandon the real seat
doctrine. 74
Another disincentive for using foreign company laws was uncertainty
about their content and the mechanics of corporate mobility for existing
firms, especially during the period before the European Union’s crossborder merger directive was finalized in 2005, 75 but thereafter as well. 76 For
example, if an existing, large European company wants to reorganize as a
public limited liability company regulated under EU law (Societas
Europaea or SE) and change its governing national company law in the
process, as Allianz did in 2006, 77 many procedural obstacles exist. 78
Commentators also questioned whether the content of harmonized
European company law was sufficiently different across jurisdictions to
create incentives for forum shopping by new or existing business entities. 79
And, assuming an EU Member State’s company law was especially
attractive to businesses from other countries, it was unclear whether those
74. See, e.g., Werner F. Ebke, Centros—Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. COMP.
L. 623, 624 (2000) (“Throughout the European Union, legal scholars and practitioners . . . are
trying to comprehend and explain the Court’s holdings in the Centros case.”). Even today,
uncertainty lingers across the European Union about the content of corporate choice-of-law rules,
since neither Centros nor its progeny expressly dealt with conflicts of law rules as such. See Frost,
supra note 68, at 369 (noting that “[t]he cases fail to deal expressly either with conflict of law
rules, or with company law”).
75. Before this directive, discussed supra at notes 58–59 and accompanying text, took effect,
the laws of some Member States authorized mergers only for domestic companies, thus precluding
a cross-border merger—traditionally the easiest method for an existing company to seamlessly
reincorporate under the company law of another jurisdiction.
76. See, e.g., Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 350 (stating that after the cross-border merger
directive took effect, “[t]he door to [corporate] mobility ha[d] opened only in theory”).
77. Allianz SE - Societas Europaea, ALLIANZ, https://www.allianz.com/en/about_us
/management/corporate_governance/legal-form.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
78. See Martin & Alogna, supra note 33, at 7–8 (describing various approval requirements that
a firm organized as a French Societe Anonime (S.A.) must satisfy to become an SE).
79. See, e.g., Luca Enriques, EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware, 15
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (2004) (“Compared with the corporate law environment in the US
when chartermongering began, not only are European company laws much more flexible than
those of most US states back then, but also some of their inflexible features . . . cannot be done
away with by Member States, because they are imposed by EC law.”).
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businesses would (or should) be concerned that ongoing compliance
obligations in the formation jurisdiction might prove unduly burdensome in
the long run. 80
Commentators also pointed to litigation obstacles that might be
associated with corporate migration within Europe. For example, it was
argued that the act of forming a company in one Member State and
maintaining the company’s real seat in another might create a sufficient
connection to the first jurisdiction so that the company could be compelled
to litigate external affairs as well as internal affairs there—a potentially
costly and inconvenient result for a company situated elsewhere.81 Such a
company might also encounter difficulty if its internal affairs matters were
litigated in its real seat Member State, where courts might be unfamiliar
with the language or company law of the organizing jurisdiction.82
3. Cultural and Political Disincentives
Other commentators noted that cultural and political factors would
make corporate migrations “less frictionless” in Europe than in the United
States, and thus reduce the level of competition and convergence in the field
of European company law. As summarized by one writer, “[l]anguage is the
most obvious cultural factor, alongside more specific business culture
matters. Firms are in fact embedded in their nation’s social context, which
company law rules reflect. Given the EU’s lesser cultural uniformity,
heterogeneous preferences may make alternative company law regimes
unattractive.” 83 Another similarly argued that, “[d]espite increasing
economic ties, the Member States have maintained their individuality and
nationalism” and that such nationalism might “keep businesses, especially
private or smaller business, within the founding citizens’ personal
jurisdiction.” 84 Other commentators concurred in these assessments, noting
that for smaller firms, “the vast majority of [which] . . . are still formed
under local corporate law rules,” there was “inertia in terms of barriers of
language, a lack of information regarding other systems and ignorance

80. See, e.g., Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 376–77 (describing ongoing compliance
obligations for companies organized as a U.K. Limited Company).
81. See Dammann, supra note 5, at 492–97. In contrast, while a U.S. corporation is subject to
general personal jurisdiction in its state of incorporation, defending litigation in a “foreign” state
presents no serious concerns given that state legal systems, language, and culture are similar
across the United States.
82. See Dammann, supra note 5, at 498.
83. Enriques, supra note 79, at 1265; accord Dammann, supra note 5, at 502 (stating that
“language barriers may be of considerable importance to small firms who do business mostly in
their real seat state,” but also acknowledging that this problem is unlikely to “deter larger
corporations who do business in multiple Member States”).
84. Jankolovits, supra note 70, at 1004.
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regarding alternatives, and the competitive advantages in some industries
based on being incorporated locally.” 85
Finally, it was suggested that members of the legal profession in the
various Member States would resist company law competition. Because
local lawyers would lose business if entity clients organized or reorganized
elsewhere, commentators argued, lawyers would be unlikely to recommend
that their clients use other Member States’ company laws. 86
B. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO DATE
As described below, the evidence to date largely bears out predictions
that there would not be dramatic competition and convergence in the field
of European company law.
1.

Entity Choice Patterns

Empirical scholarship shows that large firms in the European Union are
not engaging in forum shopping, despite new possibilities for cross-border
reincorporation of such businesses through mergers or the SE statute.87 A
recent study by Professors Marco Becht, Colin Mayer, and Hannes Wagner
found that no EU Member State incorporated “significant numbers” of
public companies in the United Kingdom—a logical jurisdiction of choice
because of its permissive company law. 88 With respect to SEs, which are
generally large firms, a study by Professors William Bratton, Joe
McCahery, and Erik Vermeulen similarly concluded, “Corporate law forum
shopping ha[d] not been a salient motivation for the 310 SEs” that had been
formed as of 2009. 89
Both these groups of scholars, as well as others, have identified a slight
trend over the past decade that favors the U.K. private company limited by
shares (the U.K. Limited), at least for small, start-up firms, many of which
are formed for businesses based in Germany or the Netherlands. 90 It is
assumed that these new firms have been attracted to the U.K. Limited’s
lower start-up costs (low initial capital requirements) and the relatively
85. Martin & Alogna, supra note 33, at 9.
86. See, e.g., Enriques, supra note 79, at 1264 (arguing that home state counsel would be

likely to oppose decisions by company law clients to organize or reorganize elsewhere).
87. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (describing these new options).
88. Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14
J. CORP. FIN. 241, 247 (2008).
89. Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 361. The number of new SEs continues to grow across the
European Union. One recent data compilation reports the SE total as 2052, many of which are
organized under the laws of Germany or the Czech Republic. See Anders Carlson et al., Overview
of Current State of SE Founding in Europe, WORKER PARTICIPATION, 3 (Jan. 1, 2014),
http://www.worker-participation.eu/content/download/5793/96801/file/SE-Facts&Figures-01-012014.pdf.
90. See Armour, supra note 40, at 387 (reporting growing trend of German firms incorporating
in the United Kingdom); Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 374–80; see generally Becht et al., supra
note 88.
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short time frame (days rather than weeks) in which a U.K. Limited can be
established. 91
The trend favoring the U.K. Limited appears to have slowed in recent
years, however, as start-up firms fail or encounter difficulties with ongoing
U.K. reporting requirements. 92 Moreover, the volume of firms taking
advantage of the U.K. Limited option has been characterized as “rather
trivial . . . , both as an economic proposition and as a lawmaking
motivation.” 93 In short, after considering the results of a prior study, as well
as their own research into EU entity choice patterns, Bratton and his coauthors conclude: “Mobility is still largely constrained by member state
regulation.” 94
2.

Convergence

Scholars have found some evidence that EU Member States with
restrictive corporate laws are responding to competitive pressures in the
post-Centros era, particularly as regards costs of formation. 95 Examples
include recent company law changes in France reducing the capital required
to form a limited liability company—known there as a société par actions
simplifiée (SAS)—to one Euro. 96 Germany has also enacted company law
reforms, known by the acronym MoMiG, in response to what one
commentator calls “The ‘Invasion’ of the British Ltd.” 97 These changes
relax the requirements of Germany’s limited liability company law—the
law applicable to a Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH)—to,
among other things, reduce minimum capital requirements and speed up
registration processes.98 The Netherlands has also enacted reforms that

91. Becht et al., supra note 88, at 250 (“[The data show that] what does matter for corporate
mobility are the large differences regarding minimum capital requirements and setup costs.”);
Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 376 (“European firms incorporating in the United Kingdom are
mostly ‘round-trippers’ looking for rock bottom cost and speed.”). Web ads like those on the U.K.
Companies House website show how simple the process is. Web Incorporation Service,
COMPANIES HOUSE, https://ewf.companieshouse.gov.uk//runpage?page=welcome (last visited
Apr. 11, 2014).
92. Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 376 (characterizing the survival rate of foreign private
limited companies as “extraordinarily low”).
93. Id. at 352.
94. Id. at 385.
95. See, e.g., Becht et al., supra note 88, § 4.4; Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 380–84.
96. This development is reported by Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 379. For a more detailed
summary of recent changes to French company law, see Martin & Alogna, supra note 33, at 16
nn.123–24.
97. Gregor Bachmann, Introductory Editorial: Renovating the German Private Limited
Company—Special Issue on the Reform of the GmbH, 9 GER. L.J. 1063, 1066 (2008).
98. See Michael Beurskens & Ulrich Noack, The Reform of German Private Limited
Company: Is the GmbH Ready for the 21st Century?, 9 GER. L.J. 1069, 1071 (2008).
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reduce initial capital requirements for small businesses and permit
shareholders to contract for special corporate governance rules. 99
These changes do not reflect a dramatic level of corporate law
convergence across the European Union. One set of scholars recently
concluded: “The scope of [recent corporate law] reforms [in the European
Union] remains narrow because the competitive pressure is largely limited
to economically-negligible small entrepreneurs, who mostly aim to
minimize the out of pocket costs of incorporation.” 100 Other scholars have
assessed the EU environment as having the potential for competition and
convergence in the field of company law, a state of affairs that does not yet
fully exist. 101
C. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE FROM EU BUSINESS LAWYERS AND
EXPERTS
During the summer of 2009, the author discussed these EU
developments with attorneys and legal scholars from France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in series of in-person interviews. 102
The goal of meeting with these various experts, all active in the field of
European business association law, was to gauge their attitudes and
understanding about the use of foreign business entity forms in the
European Union. The author wanted to ascertain, among other things,
whether those operating at ground level perceived that recent EU
developments had changed the business entity landscape for lawyers and
clients in day-to-day practice. In short, had the new EU internal affairs rule
taken root with company law practitioners in Europe? The author’s most
important findings are summarized below.
1. Use of Foreign Business Entities: Reputational Concerns
All of the lawyers the author interviewed outside the United
Kingdom—French, German, and Dutch—were familiar with the U.K.
Limited entity option. Yet none of the interviewees had used that form to

99. See Tom van Duuren et al., Reform Private Company Law (Flex BV) Effective from 1
October 2012, CLIFFORD CHANCE (July 10, 2012), http://www.cliffordchance.com
/publicationviews/publications/2012/06/reform_private_companylawflexbveffectiv.html.
100. Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 385.
101. See generally Karolina Carlsson, A Possible European Delaware—Can the European
Private Company Prevent It? (2006) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Jönköping University),
available at http://hj.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:4090/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
102. Interviewees included attorneys at a law firm in Paris who specialized in transactional law,
as well as French legal academics. The author also interviewed transactional lawyers from a large,
multinational law firm in Frankfurt, as well as German corporate law scholars. In the Netherlands,
the author again interviewed transactional lawyers from a large, multinational law firm, as well as
a Dutch law professor who was also an active corporate practitioner. In the United Kingdom, the
author spoke with the Dean of the Oxford University Business School.
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organize a client’s domestic business. The reasons varied, but one theme
that emerged was that of reputation.
For example, lawyers from a large multinational law firm in Frankfurt
reported having read legal publications that reported trends favoring use of
U.K. Limiteds. 103 One of these attorneys was familiar with what he called a
“how-to/cookbook” publication on the formation of a U.K. Limited.104 But
these same lawyers did not use the U.K. Limited form for their clients and
stated confidently that sophisticated, wealthy clients in Germany “would
not use” that option. 105 Indeed, these lawyers expressed the opinion that
German lenders would “require” use of a GmbH rather than deal with a
foreign entity, in part because of familiarity with creditor rights associated
with the GmbH form. 106
Similarly, the French lawyers who were interviewed—specialists in
transactional law—reported that they did not form foreign entities for their
clients who conducted domestic businesses, and preferred instead to use the
French SAS or SARL. 107 Like the German lawyers, the French lawyers
were also concerned about reputation. The lawyers noted, as an example,
that one of their clients (one not initially organized by them) was a U.K.
Limited that conducted business as a pseudo-foreign entity in France. They
reported that this company encountered operational difficulties within
France. For instance, the company’s landlord was “leery” of extending
credit to it and required additional guarantees as a condition of doing
business. 108
Business lawyers in the Netherlands also agreed that Centros and its
progeny had not produced much movement of corporations within the
European Union generally or within the Netherlands in particular, save
possibly for some small firms. 109 In the view of the lawyers interviewed at
the Amsterdam offices of a multinational law firm, which included a notary
who specialized in corporate law, it would be “odd” for a Dutch business to
organize as a U.K. Limited, and such a move might “signal a problem” to
103. Interview with Attorneys, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, in Frankfurt, Ger. (June
30, 2009) [hereinafter Freshfields Interview].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Interview with Lawyers, Didier & Lévy, in Paris, Fr. (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter Didier
Interview]. The lawyers did acknowledge that in certain circumstances, tax law considerations
might dictate a foreign incorporation, giving as an example a French investment company
organized in Luxembourg. The acronym “SARL” used in the text stands for Société Anonyme a
Responsabilité Limitée, a form of limited liability company.
108. Id.
109. Interview with Lawyers, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP, in Amsterdam, Neth. (July 6, 2009)
[hereinafter Norton Interview]. The author also conducted an extensive interview with Erik
Vermeulen, a Professor of Law at Tilburg University who serves as Vice President of Philips
International B.V. (Corporate and Financial Law) and has written about choice of law in the
European Union in the wake of Centros. See supra notes 34 and 67.
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outsiders, or at least be perceived to do so unless tax reasons justified a
different jurisdictional choice. 110 In fact, these lawyers reported seeing
examples where lenders used covenants in loan documents to guard against
any change of jurisdiction by the borrower.111
The Dutch lawyers’ concerns about the reputation of U.K. Limiteds
may be justified, at least based on recent press reports that post-date the
interviews. As summarized in a recent post on The Defining Tension, dated
May 30, 2011, “the [U.K. Limited] has got a bad reputation over the last
years among bankruptcy trustees. [A leading Dutch financial] newspaper
researched the files of 123 [U.K. Limiteds] that went bankrupt in the
Netherlands. In 79 [of these companies], the bankruptcy trustees reported
mismanagement; in 23 cases, fraud was reported.” 112 The poster concludes:
“The [U.K. Limited] seems to attract entrepreneurs who have gone bankrupt
before.” 113
2. Use of Foreign Business Entities: Concerns About
Compliance Obligations
As some commentators had surmised,114 interviewees expressed
concerns about reporting requirements that a foreign entity like the U.K.
Limited might entail. For example, German lawyers cited ongoing annual
filing obligations associated with the U.K. Limited as a potential obstacle to
use of that entity in Germany. The lawyers were concerned not only about
the work that such filings would entail for their clients, but also about
additional expenses from service companies that might be enlisted to assist
with completion and filing. 115 These concerns may also be well-founded;
recent press reports suggest that large numbers of German firms that have
used the U.K. Limited form are, in fact, failing to comply with U.K.
reporting requirements. 116
The French lawyers were similarly concerned about ongoing filing
requirements for U.K. Limited doing business in France. They noted that in
addition to complying with the U.K. rules, such a firm would also have to

110. Norton Interview, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. See Matthijs J. de Jongh, Abuse of British Ltd’s in the Netherlands, Post No. 28, DEFINING

TENSION (Feb. 27, 2011) (on file with author).
113. Id.
114. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
115. Freshfields Interview, supra note 103. The German lawyers also expressed concerns that if
a U.K. Limited did not properly file the necessary U.K. reports—a task that might be difficult for
German owners—veil-piercing theories might put the company’s owners at risk. Id.
116. Hugh Williamson, Germans Break UK Limited Company Rules, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2006),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/00877330-5345-11db-99c5-0000779e2340.html#axzz2VvL8E4QU
(“Between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of the estimated 30,000 limited companies in Germany are
failing to file financial results and other data to Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry,
according to industry insiders and a recent survey.”).
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satisfy special requirements of French law relating to reporting of financial
statements. 117
3. Changes in Domestic Company Law
Despite predictions by some scholars that the United Kingdom was
likely to emerge as a company law jurisdiction of choice, 118 none of the
lawyers or other experts the author interviewed believed that a Delaware of
Europe had emerged or was likely to do so in the near future. Among the
reasons cited by interviewees were recent reforms of domestic company
laws that add flexibility to entity formation processes. Indeed, interviewees
in France, Germany, and the Netherlands were all quite eager to discuss
recent or proposed changes to their respective countries’ company laws. As
explained below, the prevailing perception was that these changes were
responsive to Centros and related EU developments that made it possible
for domestic businesses to organize in other EU countries. However,
interviewees did not perceive that any one Member State had emerged as a
model or was making a concerted attempt to attract foreign incorporations.
Instead, they characterized ongoing company law reforms as designed to
keep domestic companies chartered at home.
For example, the French lawyers extolled the virtues of the French SAS
as a flexible business entity form with no minimum capital requirements. 119
They credited the efforts of France’s Senator Phillipe Marini, as well as a
company law organization known as ANSA, as catalysts for French
company law reforms. 120 Although not directly related to company law, the
French lawyers also called attention to France’s new “Auto-Entrepreneur”
law as an example of changes in France designed to make it easier for small
businesses and individual entrepreneurs to conduct business there. 121
As is explained in more detail in other sources, Germany’s “MoMiG”
reforms, passed in 2008, relax various requirements associated with use of
the GmbH, including minimum capital requirements. 122 Interviewees stated
that these changes were designed to encourage German businesses to
organize under German law rather than to attract foreign investors to the

117. Didier Interview, supra note 107.
118. See Armour, supra note 40, at 393–95 (arguing that the United Kingdom has incentives to

compete in the field of company law).
119. Didier Interview, supra note 107.
120. “ANSA” stands for Association Nationale des Sociétés par Actions (National Association
of Stock Companies).
121. See generally Nadine Levratto & Evelyne Serverin, Become Independent! The Paradoxical
Constraints of France’s “Auto-Entrepreneur” Regime, 52 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1780485.
122. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. The German stock company law has been
reformed as well. See generally Jessica Schmidt, Reforms in German Stock Corporation Law, 9
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 637 (2009).
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GmbH form. 123 Interviewees also identified several other subsidiary
motives for the changes. For example, one lawyer suggested that Germany
passed MoMiG partly out of a sense of “national pride”—a desire that the
GmbH not be perceived as inferior to the U.K. Limited. He also pointed out
that so long as a German company organized as a GmbH rather than as a
U.K. Limited, German creditors would be better protected. Using a GmbH
instead of a U.K. Limited would also be helpful to management and
shareholders, he argued, because German courts would be familiar with
GmbH law if a dispute were to arise. 124
4. Forum Shopping in Special Purpose Situations
Several interviewees acknowledged that some forum shopping for
entity law did occur in the European Union, but mainly in response to
special situations. The French lawyers, for example, pointed out that
Luxembourg offers a variety of attractive vehicles for investment funds. 125
The German lawyers cited strategic use of the SE to accomplish corporate
restructuring, as in the case of Allianz, which has been much reported in the
press. 126 The German lawyers also agreed with scholarly assessments that
the SE might enable a German S.A. to obtain a single-tier board and/or to
renegotiate co-determination requirements with employees.127 The Dutch
lawyers noted that they had seen examples of leveraged buyout (LBO)
transactions where the participants selected an incorporation jurisdiction in
the European Union that would facilitate necessary legal opinions to “wash
clean” the LBO. 128 But none of these narrow situations reflects a general
trend to embrace a single new EU entity or company law jurisdiction.
III. “UNCORPORATION” BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.
JURISDICTIONS
The relative stasis in substantive EU company law over the past dozen
years or so contrasts sharply with the dramatic transformations that
occurred in the field of U.S. unincorporated business association law a
decade earlier. As this Part of the Article shows, limited liability companies
(LLCs) and new limited liability forms of partnership—limited liability
partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs)—
emerged and surged in popularity through much of the 1990s as all U.S.
jurisdictions passed laws authorizing the creation of the new entities. These
123.
124.
125.
126.

Freshfields Interview, supra note 103.
Id.
Didier Interview, supra note 107.
See, e.g., SE change: Allianz Becomes the First Truly European Company, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR (Oct. 11, 2005), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/1025923/Asian-MarketsArchive/SE-change-Allianz-becomes-the-first-truly-European-company.html.
127. Freshfields Interview, supra note 103.
128. Norton Interview, supra note 109.
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remarkable developments entailed significant innovation in and
convergence of U.S. unincorporated business association laws around new
models. Indeed, an entirely new lexicon developed to accommodate a novel
business association environment that the late Professor Larry Ribstein
described as “uncorporation.” 129 What is particularly noteworthy for
purposes of the EU comparison is that all of these developments occurred in
the face of considerable uncertainty about whether and how the internal
affairs rule applied to the new business forms.
A. THE RISE OF THE LLC
The limited liability company, or “LLC” as it has come to be known, is
an unincorporated business association comprised of members who enjoy
considerable flexibility in structuring company management and operations
through an internal operating agreement. 130 Although an LLC is primarily a
creature of contract (the voluntary association of its members as expressed
through the terms of an operating agreement),131 the LLC is a legal entity
that must be organized pursuant to prescribed state procedures that include
a public filing. 132 The LLC has both partnership and corporate
characteristics; it is ordinarily taxed as a partnership, i.e., with no entity
level tax, 133 and combines that feature and flexible management rules with a
corporate attribute considered equally desirable for a business entity:
limited liability for owners and managers. 134
The origins of the LLC in the United States can be traced to a 1977
Wyoming enactment and similar Latin American business entity laws that
pre-date it. 135 As Professor Susan Pace Hamill and others have described,
129. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010).
130. See generally CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW (2008). The operational “flexibility” noted in the text
refers to the fact that company members may participate directly in LLC management as partners
do in a partnership, or they may opt for centralized management of the company by one or more
managers, similar to management by general partners in a limited partnership or by directors in a
corporation. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(providing as a default rule that management of an LLC shall be “vested in [its] managers”).
131. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity Aggregate
Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 842 (2005) (collecting authorities and asserting that “the
LLC is as much a creature of a contract among its members as it is an entity created pursuant to
statute”).
132. This state formation filing is typically called “articles of organization” or a “certificate of
organization.” See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 202 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 574 (2008) (articles of
organization); REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 456 (2008) (certificate of
organization).
133. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1997).
134. See generally Matthew G. Doré, What, Me Worry? Tort Liability Risks for Participants in
LLCs, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 267, 269 (2011) (discussing the LLC’s limited liability shield and
exceptions to it).
135. William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 855, 857–63 (1995) (describing the original Wyoming legislation and its roots in the Latin
American limitada).
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the LLC did not receive widespread attention in the United States until
1988, when the Internal Revenue Service first confirmed in Revenue Ruling
88-76 that an LLC could be taxed as a partnership, i.e., on a pass-through
basis with no entity-level tax. 136 At that time Wyoming and Florida were
the only states authorizing formation of LLCs, and both used LLC acts that
were primitive, cut-and-paste jobs combining various features of
partnership, limited partnership, and corporation law.137 After 1988, when
the LLC was finally recognized as a vehicle that provided the long-sought
combination of owner limited liability and partnership taxation in one
entity, other jurisdictions quickly added LLC acts to their business
association laws and considerably refined LLC law in the process. 138
Professor Hamill has tallied the legislative count: two states enacted
LLC laws in 1990, and four more states followed suit in 1991. 139 At that
point, as she tells it, the floodgates were wide open:
From 1992 through 1996, LLC legislation swept across the country. In
1992 ten additional states, including Delaware, passed legislation
recognizing LLCs, bringing the total to eighteen. In 1993, the year
showing the greatest number of state enactments, eighteen additional
states passed LLC legislation, bringing the total to thirty-six. By the end of
1994, twelve additional states, including New York and California,
authorized the formation of LLCs under their laws. Only three remaining
states were without LLC legislation, and by the close of 1996, they had
140
passed statutes establishing the LLC in all U.S. jurisdictions.

These new LLC laws were not simply added to the statute books for
show; lawyers and clients were also quick to embrace them. As Professor
Hamill reports in another article, “[b]etween September 2, 1988, the eve of
the IRS’s release of Revenue Ruling 88-76 (when the U.S. had less than
100 LLC filings) and December 31, 1995, over 210,000 business ventures
filed to become LLCs.” 141 Although corporate and partnership formations
outpaced new LLCs during this period on a national basis, 142 the LLC
continued to increase in popularity across the country each subsequent year,
and by the mid-2000s, the formation data showed clearly that the LLC was
136. Carney, supra note 135, at 858 (stating that the 1988 revenue ruling “opened the
floodgates” of LLC legislation); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability
Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1460 (1998) (“After the Internal Revenue Service . . . formally
recognized the LLC’s ability to be taxed as a partnership in 1988, interest in LLCs grew
exponentially.”).
137. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 135, at 858 (describing Wyoming’s first LLC law).
138. Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race, But
Heading Where?, 45 SYR. L. REV. 1193, 1220–62 (1995) (describing the sequence of state
adoptions and influences on the process).
139. Hamill, supra note 136, at 1470–74.
140. Id. at 1475–77.
141. Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate
Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 404 (1996).
142. Id. at 405.
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on top. 143 By 2011 it was fair to say that the “LLC ha[d] emerged as the
leading entity choice for new [U.S.] businesses, surpassing even the
corporation in popularity.” 144
Among the most remarkable features of the rise of the LLC in the
United States was the “meteoric pace” 145 of events. As described above,
between 1988 and 1996 every American state and the District of Columbia
followed Wyoming’s and Florida’s lead in passing LLC laws. 146 Professor
William Carney observes that “[t]he speed with which this change occurred
is nearly unprecedented in the history of American business association
law.” 147 Professor Hamill agrees: “In an incredible stampede that took less
than twenty years, most of it occurring from 1990 through 1996, LLCs
traveled from an obscure unknown business form in 1977 to a wellrecognized alternative for doing business.” 148 While the resulting LLC laws
are not strictly uniform, 149 the various state enactments share common
characteristics on most key issues. As I have written, “most states drafted
143. See, e.g., Rodney D. Crisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of
the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–
2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J.L. & FIN. 459–60,
473–75 (2010) (reporting the following 2007 numbers for LLCs, corporations, and limited
partnerships, respectively: 1,375,148 (63.58%); 747,533 (34.56%); 40,229 (1.86%)). Professor
Larry Ribstein, reporting in May 2006 on filing data from thirty-five jurisdictions, found that
“LLCs [were] up in 2005 from the prior year in almost every state, while they [were] down for
corporations in most states.” See Doré, supra note 134, at 270 n.6.
144. Doré, supra note 134, at 269 (collecting entity formation statistics).
145. Hamill, supra note 136, at 1477 (noting that the explosive growth in LLC formations
“mirrored the meteoric pace of [enactment of state LLC] statutes”); see also Hamill, supra note
141, at 404 (referring to the “meteoric pace” of state enactments).
146. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
147. Carney, supra note 135, at 859.
148. Hamill, supra note 136, at 1478.
149. Drafters began work on a uniform LLC act in the early 1990s, but the final version was not
completed until 1996, by which time nearly every jurisdiction had already adopted an LLC law.
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and Limited Liability
Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 947 (1995) (describing state adoption processes and the
relatively modest influence of NCCUSL’s Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1995) and
the ABA’s Prototype Limited Liability Company Act (1992)). As Professor Carney and others
have described, rather than waiting for a uniform law option, state bar associations took the lead in
drafting new LLC acts in an attempt to keep their respective states’ business association offerings
competitive with those already available in other parts of the country:
I attribute the reasons for [the unusually rapid enactment of LLC laws] to a highly
competitive legal market, in which lawyers seek to offer clients attractive new products at
competitive prices. I have little doubt that local bar associations are largely responsible for
this change . . . . Behind these bar associations are energetic lawyers constantly seeking new
ways to better satisfy clients’ needs. I recall the conversations within the committee in
Georgia: that some south Georgia businesses were turning to Florida LLCs, and that it was
time for Georgia to catch up with our Florida competition. I suspect that similar conversations
took place across the country. The rapid adoption of similar statutes by Colorado and
neighboring states may have been influenced by the presence of the Wyoming Act.

See Carney, supra note 135, at 859.
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LLC laws by building on earlier states’ efforts much like a cook might
tinker with a newly-received recipe.” 150
B. THE LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP REVOLUTION
The registered limited liability partnership, or “LLP” as it came to be
known, is another new limited liability entity choice that has recently
become available across all U.S. jurisdictions. Like the LLC, the LLP was
spawned by developments in the late 1980s. The key event for the LLP was
the savings and loan debacle, which sent thousands of financial institutions
into receivership in the late 1980s and early 1990s.151 Federal regulators,
seeking to hold responsible parties accountable for the crisis, turned their
sights not only on the officers and directors of failed financial institutions,
but also on the law firms and accounting firms who had advised them. 152
These claims highlighted for lawyers and accountants the potential benefits
associated with practicing their profession through a limited liability entity.
Neither limited partnerships nor professional corporations provided a sound
alternative to the general partnership business form that most professional
firms then used, and LLCs were not then widely available.153
The registered LLP offered a solution. Texas enacted legislation in
1991 that provided a partner in a general partnership with a significant
150. Doré, supra note 134, at 284; see also Tara J. Wortman, Note, Unlocking Lock-In: Limited
Liability Companies and the Key to Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1362, 1405 (1995) (observing that “LLC laws have developed rather uniformly”).
151. See Matthew G. Doré, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search
for Middle Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 695, 706 (1997) (“In
the 1980s and early 1990s, banks and savings and loans failed at an unprecedented rate. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and its now extinct colleagues, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation and the Resolution Trust Corporation . . . , typically acted as receivers
or successors of these institutions.”).
152. For a description of the professional liability crisis that erupted in the wake of the savings
and loan debacle, see Matthew G. Doré, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional
Malpractice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 127, 132–33; see also John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multistate Law
Firm, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 967, 981–82 (1995) (describing the “significant threat of vicarious
liability for law partners” posed by banking regulators’ negligence claims and noting that “[m]any
of the settlements [of these claims] came very close to [malpractice] policy limits”); Robert W.
Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1995) (describing regulatory malpractice suits against law firms in the late
1980s that “caught the attention of the hundreds of law firms that had represented banks or
thrifts”).
153. Limited partnerships were not a viable option because, under traditional limited
partnership principles, limited partners could not actively manage a partnership and at the same
time preserve their limited liability shield. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (amended 1985).
Conversion to a professional corporation presented tax and organizational difficulties for many
professional firms, and the soundness of the resulting corporate liability shield was unclear. See,
e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections
on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 377–81 (1998) (stating that “at the time of
enactment of the recent wave of LLP legislation, there was significant authority refusing to permit
limited liability” for lawyers).
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measure of limited liability protection if the partnership registered as an
LLP. 154 The LLP partner was personally liable for his own actions, and for
contractual obligations of the partnership, but not for the “errors, omissions,
negligence, incompetence or malfeasance” of co-partners, or of partnership
employees. 155 Thus, with a simple filing and payment of nominal filing
fees, an existing general partnership could convert to a partial-shield,
limited liability entity. 156 In all other respects, the normal “partnership”
rules of the Uniform Partnership Act continued to apply to general
partnerships that registered as LLPs. 157
Although the LLP marked a dramatic transformation in traditional
partnership law, the LLC had already paved the way for that result,
combining pass-through taxation and limited liability in a non-corporate
structure. Nor was it surprising that the LLP form proved enormously
attractive to professional partnerships or that other states soon emulated the
Texas statute. According to Professor Ribstein, “[LLP legislation] was
adopted in Louisiana in 1992, in three more jurisdictions in 1993 and in
thirteen additional jurisdictions in 1994.” 158 By 1995, half of U.S.
jurisdictions had LLP legislation, 159 and by 1998 nearly all the remaining
states enacted such laws. 160
As was the case with LLCs, slight LLP law variations emerged over the
course of multiple state enactments.161 The most important change was that,

154. Registration entailed an annual partnership filing with the Texas Secretary of State,
maintenance of a designated amount of malpractice insurance, payment of an annual fee, and use
of the designation “LLP” or “registered limited liability partnership” in the firm name. TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 45-A–45-C (West 1993) (repealed 2003); see also Steven A.
Waters & Matthew D. Goetz, Partnerships, 45 SW. L.J. 2011, 2022 (1992). For current LLP
registration requirements in Texas, see TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.802 (West 2012).
155. CIV. art. 6132b, § 15 (repealed 2003). Two conditions were attached: First, the liability
must have resulted from acts with which the partner was not involved, either directly or in a
supervisory capacity (i.e., vicarious tort liability was the apparent target). Second, at the time of
the acts giving rise to the liability claim, the partnership must have been properly registered with
the state as an LLP. Provisions governing the liability of LLP partners have since been revised and
recodified at BUS. ORG. § 152.801.
156. The term “partial” shield refers to the fact that, as the LLP was originally conceived,
partners remained jointly liable for obligations of the partnership that were not based in tort. See
supra note 153 and accompanying text.
157. This practice has been carried over to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, which
includes only a few provisions that distinguish LLPs from other partnerships organized
thereunder. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 303, 1101–05 (amended 1985).
158. Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
79, 86–87 (2001).
159. Hamilton, supra note 152, at 1095 (“As of the beginning of 1995, legislation recognizing
LLPs has been enacted in twenty-four states . . . .”).
160. Ribstein, supra note 158, at 87 (“Virtually all states had adopted LLC statutes by early
1998 . . . .”).
161. For example, most states dropped the requirement that LLPs carry minimum liability
insurance. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND
PRACTICE § 32:2 (2011) (“Several of the early LLP statutes . . . mandate that an LLP have
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by the mid-1990s, states began to provide “full-shield” liability protection
to LLP partners, affording them liability protection identical to that of a
corporate shareholder or LLC member. 162 In 1997 this change was
incorporated as part of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, which has
now replaced its 1914 predecessor in most jurisdictions. 163 The final LLP
innovation, which followed close on the heels of original LLP legislation in
most states, was the extension of full-shield limited liability protection to
both general and limited partners in limited partnerships, creating the
“limited liability limited partnership,” or LLLP. 164
C. THE UNCERTAIN ROLE OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE IN
LLC AND LLP LEGISLATION
Current state LLC and LLP acts include provisions that expressly adopt
the internal affairs rule. For example, both the latest Uniform LLC Act and
its predecessor provide that the law of the jurisdiction under which a
foreign LLC is organized governs the company’s internal affairs, as well as
the liability of company managers, members, and their transferees. 165 The
Uniform Partnership Act’s LLP provisions similarly provide that the law
under which a foreign LLP is formed governs “relations among the partners
insurance or an escrow account to cover liabilities . . . . More recent statutes typically do not
mandate insurance . . . .”).
162. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 323.14(2) (1995) (repealed 1997). For a complete comparative
breakdown of the LLP liability shields in the late 1990s, see Darryl Van Duch, Some Firms
Hesitate to Adopt L.L.P., NAT’L L.J., May 5, 1997, at A1, A20.
163. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 117 (2001). The most recent count by the
Uniform Law Commission lists thirty-nine jurisdictions as having adopted the Uniform
Partnership Act. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Partnership Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Partnership Act (last visited Apr. 11,
2014).
164. See Carter S. Bishop, Unincorporated Limited Liability Business Organizations: Limited
Liability Companies and Partnerships, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985, 1003–04 (1995). The pattern
of LLLP laws is more varied than laws governing LLCs and LLPs. A few jurisdictions expressly
prohibit LLLPs; other jurisdictions expressly authorize them through provisions in general or
limited partnership statutes; the remaining jurisdictions authorize LLLPs inferentially through
general partnership LLP provisions. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 583, 619 n.170 (2004). As Professor
Kleinberger’s article explains, the most recent version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
expressly includes LLLP provisions. As of fall 2012, nineteen jurisdictions had adopted that
statute. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Partnership Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Limited Partnership Act (last visited Feb
9, 2014).
165. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(a) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 515 (2008) (“The law of the . . .
jurisdiction under which a foreign limited liability company is formed governs: (1) the internal
affairs of the company; and (2) the liability of a member as member and a manager as manager
[for company obligations].”); id. § 1001(a), at 640 (“The laws of the . . . jurisdiction under which
a foreign limited liability company is organized govern its organization and internal affairs and the
liability of its managers, members, and their transferees.”); see also The Revised Prototype
Limited Liability Company Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 117, 186 (2011) (noting, in comment to section
801, that “[LLC] acts around the country . . . [provide] that the organization and internal affairs of
a foreign limited liability company are governed by the laws of its jurisdiction of formation”).
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and between the partners and the partnership and the liability of partners for
obligations of the partnership.” 166 States that have adopted non-uniform
versions of these laws do the same. 167
In contrast to the clarity of current law on these points, during the
period when LLCs and LLPs first emerged and when states were rushing to
craft legislation authorizing them, it was far from clear whether and how the
internal affairs rule applied to the new entities and whether their limited
liability shields would be respected outside the jurisdictions in which the
entities were organized. 168 As Professor Carney describes it, “LLCs
remained surrounded with uncertainties” at this time, including
“uncertainties about the extent of limited liability for members where LLCs
did business outside their home jurisdiction in a foreign state lacking
authorizing legislation for LLCs.” 169 A similar uneasiness applied with
respect to LLPs operating outside their formation state.170
The primary concern was that if litigation were commenced against an
LLC or LLP doing business in a jurisdiction that had not yet adopted a
similar law, or at least a law providing for the qualification of foreign LLCs
or LLPs, courts in the forum state might decide that recognizing the foreign
166. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 1101(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 255 (2001).
167. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-901(a)(1) (2013) (“The laws of the . . . jurisdiction . .

. under which a foreign limited liability company is organized govern its . . . internal affairs and
the liability of its members and managers . . . .”). It may seem odd that these statutory choice-oflaw rules encompass not only internal affairs but also limited liability rules that affect third
parties, which are clearly external affairs. Nonetheless, accepted corporate conflict of law
principles normally defer to the organizing jurisdiction on similar limited liability issues. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 307 (1971) (providing that “the local law of
the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder’s
liability to the corporation for assessments or contributions and to its creditors for corporate
debts”).
168. See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the
Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 448–56 (1992) (arguing that U.S. jurisdictions should treat a
foreign LLC like a foreign corporation and thereby respect both the company and its limited
liability shield); Joseph A. Rodriguez, Comment, Wyoming Limited Liability Companies: Limited
Liability and Taxation Concerns in Other Jurisdictions, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 539, 539
(1992) (examining “the potential problems that a Wyoming LLC may face if it extends its
operations into foreign jurisdictions”).
169. Carney, supra note 135, at 859; accord Thomas E. Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You
Have Not Been Told You May Go: LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs in Interstate Transactions, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 205, 206 (2006) (“When . . . LLCs . . . were available in relatively few states,
there existed a continuing uneasiness with the use of these novel structures in interstate commerce
because of uncertainty regarding whether limited liability would be retained for the members (and
managers) doing business in those jurisdictions that had not yet adopted LLC acts.”).
170. See Martin I. Lubaroff, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Wave,
FORMING AND USING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, at
503, 539 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 836, 1994) (“[If] a partnership
operates solely in a state that recognizes an LLP and is formed under the laws of that state, there
should not be any question concerning recognition . . . . Apart from [that] example, under a more
traditional choice-of-law analysis, consideration must be given to the extent of the relationship of
a partnership with the state of formation and to the conflict of law approach under the law of the
jurisdiction in which litigation arises . . . .”).
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entity and its liability shield would be contrary to the forum state’s own
policy interests. Those policy interests might include the fact that the forum
state had not yet authorized such novel entities and that the foreign entity’s
limited liability shield could limit recovery by claimants from the forum
state. 171
Some scholars reasoned that states without LLC or LLP laws might
nonetheless respect and apply such laws as enacted by other states. The
basis for recognition might be principles of comity 172 or requirements under
the Full Faith and Credit or Interstate Commerce clauses of the U.S.
Constitution. 173 But it was difficult to be confident on either score because
the extension of limited liability principles made by LLC and LLP laws
could easily raise policy concerns on the part of states that had not yet
enacted them.
As more and more states adopted LLC and LLP laws through the
1990s, and certainly as more and more LLC and LLP statutes expressly
embraced the internal affairs rule through foreign qualification provisions,
concerns ultimately subsided about application of the internal affairs rule to
foreign LLCs and LLPs, and about respect for their liability shields across
state lines. 174 The point, for present purposes, is that given the initial
uncertainty surrounding the internal affairs rule as applied in the new LLC
and LLP settings, one can hardly credit application of the internal affairs
rule, and the jurisdictional competition it facilitates, as the sole reason why
U.S. jurisdictions so readily embraced LLC and LLP laws.

171. See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 168, at 452 (“If an LLC member is analogized to a limited
partner or general partner . . . , the Restatement does not provide a dispositive rule as to whether
the forum state would adopt the limited liability provisions of the LLC’s state of organization.
Instead, section 295 of the Restatement indicates that the local law of the state selected by
applying the rules under section 6(2) of the Restatement would govern. Section 6(2) gives the
forum court wide latitude in examining the critical ‘relevant policies of the forum’ factor.”).
172. Comity is the conflict of laws principle that a state will recognize and effectuate the laws
of another state so long as the foreign state’s law does not conflict with local law or raise other
policy concerns. As one source recently expressed it, in the United States, “comity has served as a
principle of deference to foreign law and foreign courts . . . .” Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of
International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 20 (2008). For an argument that states
without LLC laws might recognize foreign LLCs based on principles of comity, see Keatinge,
supra note 168, at 453–54. For a similar argument concerning LLPs, see Lubaroff, supra note
170, at 536.
173. See Keatinge, supra note 168, at 454–56 (making Full Faith and Credit and Interstate
Commerce Clause arguments for recognition of foreign LLCs); Lubaroff, supra note 170, at 536
(making Full Faith and Credit Clause argument for recognition of LLPs).
174. For an analysis of a few lingering concerns about the scope of liability protection for
participants in LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs that do business across state lines, see Rutledge, supra
note 169.
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IV. COMPARING THE RECENT EUROPEAN AND U.S.
EXPERIENCES
If the new EU internal affairs rule and the EU legal changes described
in Part I permit jurisdictional competition in the field of European company
law, why have Europe’s company laws not changed and converged in
content as their U.S. corporate counterparts have? And if the internal affairs
rule is a key driver of jurisdictional competition and convergence, why did
U.S. unincorporated business association laws change and converge
dramatically to embrace LLCs and LLPs, even before it became clear that
the internal affairs rule applied to the new entities? This Part argues that the
answer lies in nuanced views of jurisdictional competition and corporate
law convergence patterns that several scholars have recently advanced.
These views not only provide alternative perspectives on these issues, but
also serve as a helpful reminder that focusing on jurisdictional competition
and convergence patterns can obscure a key purpose of comparative
corporate governance study—to learn from other legal systems.
A. CHALLENGES TO MARKET COMPETITION THEORIES OF
CORPORATE LAW CONVERGENCE
As explained in the Introduction, commentators have long contended
that corporate laws are shaped by market forces and jurisdictional
competition that the internal affairs rule makes possible.175 Part I.A further
described how law and economics scholars have built on this assumption
and made stronger claims: that the internal affairs rule, together with market
forces, promote adoption of more efficient corporate laws that eliminate
unnecessary regulation. 176 Recall as well the prediction that the “end of
history” for corporate law would be marked by global convergence on a
shareholder-centered model of the corporation.177
But there are competing views. For example, Professor Mark Roe has
explained that the development and survival of corporate laws and
institutions are influenced not only by efficiency considerations, but also by
“initial, often accidental conditions (chaos theory), [by] the history of
problems that had to be solved in the past but that may be irrelevant today
(path dependence), and [by] evolutionary accidents—what might do best
today could have been selected out for extinction in the past.” 178 Although
Roe agrees that the laws and institutions that survive “cannot be too
inefficient,” he contends that an “evolution-toward-efficiency” theory
“constrains but does not fully determine” the current condition of business
175.
176.
177.
178.

(1996).

See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641
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association laws. 179 To take one example, Roe’s seminal work Strong
Managers, Weak Owners illustrates the phenomenon of “path dependency,”
explaining how populist politics operating in a federal system limited the
role of financial institutions in U.S. corporate governance, and thus put state
corporate laws on a different “path” than those adopted in other
countries. 180 Among other important lessons, Roe’s work demonstrates that
efficiency considerations are not the only forces that determine the content
of business association law; historical accidents, political vectors, and
resulting path dependencies are also important determinants that shape its
contours.
Building on Roe’s work, Professor Ronald Gilson has argued that
corporate institutions respond to competitive pressures in a variety of ways.
These include adoption of what Gilson calls “functional convergence”
measures, where the formal legal environment remains static, but corporate
actors utilize available flexibility within the existing legal system to find
new solutions “within their path dependent limits.”181 In Gilson’s words,
“institutions are shaped by a form of corporate governance plate tectonics,
in which the demands of current circumstances grind against the influence
of initial conditions.” 182
More recently, Professor Donald Clarke has argued that comparative
corporate governance scholarship places undue emphasis on convergence as
a function of competitive economic pressures.183 “Since corporations have
not as an empirical matter all migrated out of all countries except one (the
one that has the best rules),” he points out, “it must not be true that selection
pressures work the way the [law and economics] story says they do.” 184
Professor Franklin Gevurtz also disputes that corporate law
convergence is the inevitable result of competitive pressures for ever more
efficient laws. 185 Gevurtz agrees with Roe and Gilson that path
dependencies and other forces may preserve divergent corporate laws
despite the laws’ relative merits on an efficiency scale, and he argues
further that corporate law convergence can occur as a result of “fads and
fashions,” promoting new norms that lack any particular efficiency

179. Id.
180. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994); see also Lucian

Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (describing two sources of path dependence: initial
ownership structures and initial corporate law rules).
181. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 338 (2001).
182. Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions
Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 332 (1996).
183. Donald C. Clarke, 'Nothing but Wind’? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate
Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2011).
184. Id. at 100.
185. Gevurtz, supra note 25.
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advantage. 186 Most importantly, Gevurtz reminds us that the critical
tensions that corporate and other business association laws must address—
tensions between owners and managers, owners and creditors, majority
owners and minority owners, etc.—have never been capable of easy
resolution. 187 As a result, he contends, global convergence around any one
solution or set of solutions that purports to resolve those issues is unlikely,
if not impossible. 188
B. THE EU EXPERIENCE AND FORCES OF DIVERGENCE
Considered from the perspective of these more nuanced scholarly views
about competition and corporate law convergence, it is not entirely
surprising that European jurisdictions have not yet competed vigorously in
the field of company law despite the freedom to do so and that European
company laws do not yet all conform to the most efficient alternatives.
Recall the various forces of divergence described in Part II.A: franchise tax
obstacles that may diminish incentives for EU Member States to compete
for new company formations; the importance of judicial expertise in
creating an attractive company law for foreign users; uncertainty about the
scope of the new EU internal affairs rule and the mechanics of corporate
mobility; ongoing compliance difficulties and possible litigation obstacles
that pseudo-foreign companies may face within the European Union; as
well as cultural and political disincentives that might discourage use of
foreign company laws. 189 Whether best understood as vestiges of path
dependence or as idiosyncratic counterweights that naturally resist
efficiency-based forces, these vectors, individually or collectively, may well
be sufficiently powerful to overcome natural competitive pressures that
favor more permissive company laws.
Alternatively, and taking a leaf from Professor Gilson’s convergence
analysis, EU countries directly threatened by outside competition, such as
France, Germany, and the Netherlands have faced from the United
Kingdom, may have already accomplished functional convergence with the
United Kingdom with reforms that favorably affect cost and speed of
company formation.190 These modest legal adjustments may alleviate the
need for more extensive, conforming changes to French, German, and
Dutch company laws. When the U.S. experience with uncorporation is
added to the discussion, there is some evidence of a related trend on the
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 496–500.
Id. at 511–20.
Id. at 520.
See supra notes 72–86 and accompanying text.
As described in Part II.A, two potentially important advantages that a European company
law could offer over its competitors in other Member States—low filing fees and rapid processing
of entity formation paperwork—appear to have prompted some movement within the European
Union towards the U.K. Limited and modest conforming changes in at least three Member States’
business entity laws. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
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importance of costs. At least one study has found that the use of new LLC
laws over corporation laws across the United States is best predicted not by
the content of such laws, but rather by start-up costs—specifically, whether
the LLC enjoys a formation fee advantage over a corporation.191
C. THE U.S. UNCORPORATION EXPERIENCE AND INEFFICIENT
FORCES OF CONVERGENCE
The convergence of U.S. unincorporated business association laws
around new LLC and LLP entity options is a useful counterexample to the
European experience and may illustrate the impact of what Professors Roe
or Gevurtz might characterize as “inefficient” convergence forces. These
novel laws developed and converged across the United States at a time
when it was not yet clear that the internal affairs rule applied to the new
entities, thus making jurisdictional competition for new entity formations at
best a weak force promoting change and convergence. 192 Even today, when
statutory law makes clear that the internal affairs rule applies to LLCs and
LLPs, there is little evidence of inter-jurisdictional competition for
“uncorporation” formations. 193 If not competition for entity formations
under the internal affairs rule and pressures to enact ever more efficient
business association laws, what forces prompted convergence of state laws
around new LLC and LLP options?

191. See Daniel M. Hausermann, For a Few Dollars Less: Explaining State to State Variation
in Limited Liability Company Popularity, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (finding that
formation fee differentials explain more of the variation of LLC popularity across jurisdictions
than any other factor).
192. See supra Part III.C.
193. Three separate empirical studies have found little evidence that U.S. jurisdictions currently
compete for LLC formations, or that such competition (as it exists) favors Delaware more than at
the margins. See Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies
Formed? An Empirical Analysis, 55 J. L. & ECON. 741 (2012) (finding that for LLCs with more
than twenty members, companies are more likely to be formed outside the state of their primary
place of business if the primary place of business does not allow members to trigger the
dissolution on oppression grounds, or if it does not shield from veil piercing for the mere failure to
observe formalities); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Why Delaware LLCs?, 91 OR. L. REV. 57, 57–58
(2012) (reporting results of an attorney survey showing that attorneys forming LLCs evidenced a
modest preference for Delaware when forming LLCs outside their home state); Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited
Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 94 (summarizing findings of “little evidence that
[LLCs] choose to form outside their home state in order to take advantage of variations in [LLC]
statutory provisions” and some evidence that large LLCs are more likely to organize outside their
home state, with Delaware as the “dominant” destination jurisdiction). Indeed, one scholar has
recently argued that “the high level of contractability and the resulting reduction in legal
indeterminacy available under LLC law” reduces Delaware’s traditional competitive advantages
in the LLC field when compared to those that Delaware enjoys in corporate law. Mohsen Manesh,
Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractability and Legal Indeterminacy, 52
B.C. L. REV. 189, 189 (2011).
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A “Better Law” Movement, Path Dependent Development,
or “Fad and Fashion”?

Of course, competition for entity formations under the internal affairs
rule is only one chapter in the law market story. In the view of some
scholars, “the United States has fostered an active law market, not because
of the choice-of-law rules themselves, but because of the dynamism
inherent in the institutional features of the American federal system.” 194
Even if states have not competed to attract new LLCs and LLPs, the
uncorporation revolution might be characterized as a movement by states
towards substantively better or more efficient laws within a broader market
for business association laws across the United States. Thus, one might
argue, the primary reason new uncorporation laws spread rapidly across
jurisdictions was because states recognized that these new entities offered
sound solutions for vexing tax, liability, and organizational problems
confronting closely held businesses.
As described in Part III, LLC and LLP laws accomplish a striking
achievement—combining limited liability, pass-through taxation, and
organizational flexibility in one unincorporated business entity. 195 Because
these new entities are primarily creatures of contract (an LLC operating
agreement or an LLP partnership agreement), they are also products of
private ordering processes that should foster efficient outcomes, and many
law and economics scholars support the expansion of limited liability on
efficiency grounds. 196 Without question, the lawyers who drafted LLC and
LLP laws and who pressed for their passage in the various states—typically
through state bar association committees—had no doubt about the benefits
the new entities offered for their business clients.197 Why should we be
surprised that states rushed to authorize LLCs and LLPs?
But there were countervailing considerations. To state the obvious,
expanding the reach of pass-through taxation, and thus eliminating one
194. Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Rules and Institutions in Developing a Law Market:
Views from the United States and Europe, 82 TULANE L. REV. 2147, 2162 (2008).
195. See notes 135–138, 152–156 and accompanying text; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The
Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (1995); see generally Hamill,
supra note 141, at 395.
196. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 450–51 (1995) (arguing that the economic justifications for limited liability
are valid in closely held LLCs); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the
Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 101–06 (1991) (arguing that limited liability is efficient even in
closely held firms).
197. Professor Ribstein and other law and economics scholars have characterized these new
laws as examples of legal innovations that were largely byproducts of practicing business lawyers
who drafted laws and lobbied for their enactment on behalf of clients. Bruce H. Kobayashi &
Larry E. Ribstein, Law as a Byproduct: Theories of Private Law Production 19–20 (Ill. Law,
Behavior & Soc. Sci. Research Paper Series, Paper No. LBSS11-27, 2011), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/SSRN-id1884985_(1).pdf; see also supra note 149
(exploring Professor William Carney’s similar assessment of LLC laws).
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level of tax, may have diminished state revenues. 198 And extending the
corporate limited liability shield to non-corporate entities shifted tort
liability risks to accident victims who would rarely, if ever, be able to
protect themselves in advance by contract. 199
Yet, whether or not new LLC and LLP laws offered economic
efficiency or other advantages that outweighed these concerns was not
debated or even discussed as the laws were passed in state legislatures. As
several commentators have shown, LLC and LLP laws were enacted by
legislators who assumed without question that the new entity options would
be “good for business,” and without any serious debate about the merits of
the new business formats. 200 Dean Allan Vestal and unincorporated
business law expert Thomas Rutledge conclude after a “close review of the
legislative record” that “in state after state the serious policy and fiscal
implications of [LLCs] were not even addressed, much less seriously
discussed.” 201
Commentator Bill Callison concurs with the Vestal/Rutledge analysis
and analogizes the rapid movement by states to extend limited liability
through LLC and LLP laws to the cattle herd that stampedes when the
coyote howls. 202 Callison disputes the economic efficiency justifications
that have been advanced for the new entities 203 and instead makes the case
that the LLC/LLP movement illustrates Roe’s path dependence model:
198. Allan W. Vestal & Thomas E. Rutledge, Disappointing Diogenes: The LLC Debate That
Never Was, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 80–90 (2006) (examining revenue implications of expanded
pass-through entity taxation in Kentucky).
199. Id. at 72–73; see also Doré, supra note 134, at 270–71.
200. See generally Vestal & Rutledge, supra note 198; accord Robert W. Hillman, New Forms
and New Balances: Organizing the External Relations of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 613, 613 (1997) (“Like Diogenes wandering the streets of Athens, lantern in hand,
searching for the honest man, anyone seeking evidence of a debate among lawmakers over the
wisdom of limited liability or the cost-shifting consequences of LLCs and LLPs is destined for
disappointment.”); Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 615, 627 (1997) (noting that legislatures in earlier times (e.g., the nineteenth century)
displayed “a level of inquiry, a quality of debate, and an awareness of history that is largely absent
from contemporary discussions of limited liability”); see also Allan W. Vestal, “Real
Partnerships” and Real Problems, Conforming Business Entity Law to Fiscal Realities and
Popular Conceptions, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 880 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he policy implications
of extending limited liability to the members of [general partnerships through the LLP] were never
seriously discussed”); Robert W. Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and the Real
World, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 691 (1997) (“[S]tates that have broadened the LLP concept
have in effect reversed the default rule without in any way considering or justifying that action.”);
but see Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 149, 951–52 (“[T]he collective wisdom over time of
fifty-one legislatures and bar drafting committees must be far greater than that of one uniform or
model law drafting organization.”).
201. Vestal & Rutledge, supra note 198, at 55.
202. J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited Liability
Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. CORP. L. 951, 961 (2001)
(“[L]egislators failed to consider the public policy aspects of expansive limited liability protection
before they acted . . . .”).
203. Id. at 964–71.
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“[T]he IRS’s regulatory response to Wyoming LLCs,” he argues,
“introduced dynamic forces into business organization law, and the law
responded by referring back to, and evolving from, existing structures and
rules.” 204 Whether or not Callison’s path dependence analysis is accurate,
his herd analogy is illuminating. Given the lack of policy debate in state
legislatures concerning LLC and LLP laws that Vestal, Rutledge, and others
have demonstrated, one is strongly tempted to conclude that the passage of
these entity laws illustrates what Professor Gevurtz calls “fads and
fashions” in business association law—where laws of multiple jurisdictions
converge in a popular trend without regard for legal efficiency or other
considerations. 205
2. Rule-Driven Path Dependence (Foreignness Matters)
Theories of path-dependent evolution of business association laws also
encompass “rule-driven path dependence”: the idea that existing structures
and institutions influence choices about what rules should be adopted or
maintained in the future. 206 One way this might occur is that the
“foreignness” (or not) of a new business association law—a factor unrelated
to the competitive merits of any particular law—might influence change
and convergence patterns across jurisdictions. The stasis in European
company law, when compared to the U.S. uncorporation revolution, could
well be an example of this phenomenon.
Remember that although corporate laws across different national
jurisdictions share many common functional characteristics,207 formal rules
of corporate regulation differ significantly across nations, including across
EU Member States with harmonized company law.208 Of those
commentators who correctly predicted that the EU legal developments
described in Part I.B would not produce dramatic change and convergence
in the field of European company law, several based their forecast on a
variety of obstacles that these formal legal differences might create, along
with related cultural and political hurdles. 209
204. Id. at 962.
205. Gevurtz, supra note 25, at 496–97.
206. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 180, at 154 (“Corporate rules, we argue, are themselves

path dependent. The rules that an economy has at any given point in time depend on, and reflect,
the ownership and governance structures that the economy had initially . . . . The initial structures
affect future corporate rules which in turn affect future decisions on corporate structures.”).
207. See generally REINER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004) (using a functional approach to show how
countries with very different legal rules have developed similar solutions to common corporate
law problems).
208. For example, of the five different corporate law jurisdictions selected for comparative
analysis in The Anatomy of Corporate Law, three (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are
EU Member States. See id.
209. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. Consistent with these predictions, the EU
legal experts the author interviewed all expressed concerns that a European business would face
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The recent U.S. uncorporation experience bolsters those predictions,
albeit as a counter-example. One reason that it was easy for U.S.
jurisdictions to rapidly embrace LLCs and LLPs was that the novel entities
were not particularly “foreign” to new users. LLC and LLP laws, though
new, were adapted from familiar common sources—general partnership,
limited partnership, and corporate law—that were shared by all states. 210 In
addition, U.S. business association laws, including new LLC and LLP laws,
are more limited in scope than their European counterparts, which often
include not only creditors’ rights, but also employment law provisions as
well. 211 The narrower reach of U.S. business association laws reduces the
potential scope of any legal conflicts that might otherwise impede the
adoption of such laws across jurisdictions. 212 Finally, while the new EU
internal affairs rule has had a mixed reception across Europe,213 lawyers
reputational obstacles and uncertain compliance burdens if it organized under another Member
State’s law and operated domestically as a pseudo-foreign company. See supra notes 101–111 and
accompanying text.
210. Consider the state of U.S. business association law in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
time period when LLC and LLP laws first emerged. Then, as now, the corporate law of nearly all
states was derived from one of only two primary sources—the ABA’s Model Business
Corporation Act or the Delaware General Corporation Law. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 23,
§ 2:5 (noting that “[e]ventually, the Model Act became the pattern for large parts of the
corporation statutes in most states”); see also Gorris et al., supra note 23. State general and limited
partnership laws were even more uniform at that time than they are today, with nearly all state
laws for general partnerships based on the Uniform Partnership Act, and in the case of limited
partnerships, either the original or revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Thus, when a lawyer
or her business client encountered a “foreign” corporation or partnership—one organized in
another U.S. jurisdiction—that entity was not very foreign at all and would not have raised
reputational concerns for the lawyer or client. At that time it was fair to say that in the United
States, a general partnership was the same legal entity, regardless of the state law under which it
was organized. The same was largely true for limited partnerships and corporations.
211. Not only do European company laws often include important creditors’ rights provisions,
bankruptcy laws also vary across the European Union. See Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, How
the Old World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in European
Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 577, 581, 622–23 (2007); see also Federico M.
Mucciarelli, The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and
the EU, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L., 421 (2012) (noting the connections between creditor
protections in European company laws and rates of reincorporation). For a discussion of European
company law provisions protecting employees, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
212. U.S. business association laws leave most creditor protection issues to other law, important
parts of which are either uniform (e.g., the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act) or federal, in the
case of bankruptcy. Moreover, all U.S. jurisdictions address employment law matters separately
from business association law and much of that law is federalized and thus effectively uniform
across the states.
213. As described in Part I.B., the various EU Member States did not adopt a new European
internal affairs rule because of a shared belief in the rule’s merits—what one might call a “bottomup” approach to choice of law. Rather, the ECJ imposed the internal affairs rule on the Member
States from the top down, through novel case law interpretations of the EU Treaty. As described
in Part II, this state of affairs produced uncertainty not only about the scope and applicability of
the new internal affairs rule, but also about attendant procedures necessary for businesses to
effectively utilize the rule, like foreign qualification processes and foreign jurisdiction litigation
risks. See supra notes 74–78 and 81–82 and accompanying text.

356

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 8

across U.S. jurisdictions have confidence in the internal affairs rule and the
foreign qualification processes that have developed along with it. After an
initial period of uncertainty, these familiar processes were later easily
adapted to the new unincorporated entity options, thus reducing the risks
associated with foreign operations under the new laws. 214
In short, one might fairly describe new LLC and LLP laws as old wine
in new bottles for the most part. Whatever the analogy, when one compares
the U.S. uncorporation revolution to company law stasis in Europe, it is
tempting to conclude that the foreignness (or not) of business association
laws across jurisdictions—a factor largely unrelated to competitiveness and
efficiency merits of any particular new law—influences the rate of change
and convergence of competing business association laws.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING
FROM COMPARISONS
The persistent stasis in European company law following new
possibilities for jurisdictional competition for company formations within
the European Union, and the unexpected convergence of U.S. jurisdictions
on novel unincorporated business forms before the internal affairs rule
clearly applied to them, both call into question the traditional view that
jurisdictional competition under the internal affairs rule, and related market
pressures that favor the adoption of ever more “efficient” business
association laws, are the principal drivers of corporate and business
association law convergence. Indeed, it may be the case that no single
theory will likely predict successfully how state and national business
association laws will change and evolve. But to concede that fact does not
diminish the importance of comparative law scholarship in the business
association law field.
Both Professors Clarke and Gevurtz have recently reminded us that if
comparative corporate governance study focuses solely on competition and
convergence of business association laws, we will likely miss opportunities
to learn from the approaches taken by other legal systems. As Professor
Clarke puts it, “[t]here is value in determining which features of which
system do what well and do what badly. If policy advocacy has any real214. As explained in Part III.C, while there was some early uncertainty in the United States
about whether the internal affairs rule applied to novel entities like LLCs and LLPs, the rule
stands on much firmer footing here than it does in the European Union. In the early years of LLC
and LLP laws, uncertainty concerning the internal affairs rule stemmed only from the fact that all
jurisdictions had not yet adopted such laws. As states enacted LLC and LLP acts, none deviated
from the internal affairs choice-of-law approach. Thus, jurisdictions embraced the rule in bottomup fashion, reflecting the business law community’s confidence in and comfort with the
correctness of that choice-of-law approach for the new entities. In addition, limited partnership
and corporate laws provided a familiar and simple template for the new entity laws’ foreign
qualification processes, thus eliminating concerns about compliance for any LLCs or LLPs that
might do business across state lines.
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world effect, then one should advocate what seems to work well, regardless
of what direction the rest of the world is going in.” 215
In the words of Professor Gevurtz:
[To dispute efficiency theories of corporate law convergence] is not to say
that observing other nations’ corporate laws is useless or unwise. If
nothing else, we will learn that there are alternate approaches which may
be as effective as our own. We may also learn, however, that when it
comes to the really tough issues, no nation has a good solution—which is
216
why these are the really tough issues in corporate law.

And, in fact, there are many good reasons to compare U.S. corporate
and unincorporated business association law experience with company law
developments in Europe now that it is apparent that European company law
schemes will continue to depart in important ways from traditional U.S.
models. Areas for productive inquiry could include the following:
U.S. Benefit Corporations and European Company Law Stakeholder
Models. A number of U.S. jurisdictions have recently authorized new
corporate forms, called “benefit” or “B-” corporations, which are permitted
to advance non-shareholder interests alongside a traditional, for-profit
agenda. 217 As this movement occurs, important questions are resurfacing
about which corporate stakeholders are worthy of special protection and the
most effective corporate governance mechanisms to accomplish that goal.
One hot topic, for example, is whether a corporation must have special
obligations to protect the environment in order to qualify as a benefit
corporation. A number of states have enacted the “B-Lab” organization’s
model benefit corporation legislation, which requires that a benefit
corporation’s charter must have as an objective “to provide a material
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as
assessed against a third-party standard.” 218 A few states, like California,
have enacted a “flexible public purpose” corporation law alongside the BLab’s model benefit corporation law, with the former defining “public
benefit” in broader terms. 219 Looking to past and present European
company law experience with stakeholder protection may help shed light on
these and other issues that will undoubtedly emerge as benefit corporation
215. Clarke, supra note 183, at 103.
216. Gevurtz, supra note 25, at 520–21.
217. So far, eighteen states have enacted benefit corporation laws based on Model Benefit

Corporation Legislation promulgated by the B-Lab group. See Legislation, B LAB,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); see also
Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0—A Breakthrough in
Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047 (2011).
218. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B Lab 2013), available at
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf
(Definitions).
219. See Arthur Rieman et al., California’s New Hybrid Corporation Statute, L.A. LAW., Sept.
2012, at 19.
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legislation takes root. Fortunately, comparative corporate governance
scholarship is now emerging on these topics.220
Fiduciary Duties in the Zone of Insolvency and Wrongful Trading
Liability Standards. Much ink has been spilled over the vexing problem of
whether or when managers of U.S. corporations and other business
associations owe duties to creditors, and the topic of fiduciary duties of
managers of businesses operating in the “zone of insolvency” has attracted
renewed attention following the recent recession. 221 Perhaps an examination
of European wrongful trading liability standards, which penalize directors
who take no action to protect creditors’ interests during their company’s
slide into insolvency, will yield fresh insights. 222 Comparative corporate
governance scholarship is beginning to emerge on this topic as well. 223
Regulation of Pseudo-Foreign Entities in the United States and
Europe. Application of the internal affairs rule to pseudo-foreign entities—
firms not organized under the law of their real seat jurisdiction and whose
only connection to the organizing jurisdiction is the company’s charter—
raises special concerns. The United States might usefully learn from
European experience in this area as well.
The legal developments in the European Union described in Part I.B
have not met with unqualified acceptance. Justin Borg-Barthet, a scholar
who has extensively studied the new EU internal affairs rule, makes a
persuasive case that Europe should enact legislation that scales back
application of the internal affairs rule for pseudo-foreign companies. 224 He
proposes choice-of-law reforms for the European Union that would permit a
real seat Member State to require pseudo-foreign companies to comply with
critical components of the Member State’s company law. 225 As students of
American corporate law will recognize, these arguments echo both
220. See, e.g., Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309 (2011); Alissa Mickels, Note,
Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporation with
Director Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271 (2009).
221. See, e.g., John A. Pearce & Ilya A. Lipin, The Duties of Directors and Officers Within the
Fuzzy Zone of Insolvency, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 361 (2011); Neil Ruben, Note, Duty to
Creditors in Insolvency and the Zone of Insolvency: Delaware and the Alternatives, 7 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 333 (2010).
222. For a discussion of wrongful trading standards see Andrew Keay, Wrongful Trading and
the Liability of Company Directors: A Theoretical Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (2006).
223. See, e.g., Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Solving Creditor Problems in the
Twilight Zone: Superfluous Law and Inadequate Private Solutions, 34 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 61
(2012).
224. BORG-BARTHET, supra note 37, at 142–70. Borg-Barthet points out that corporate choiceof-law principles are derived theories of party autonomy that also influence contractual choice-oflaw principles. Id. at 21. Although the latter often command application of the law chosen by
contracting parties, he notes, choice-of-law theory recognizes that public policy considerations
sometimes justify a jurisdiction’s decision to override that choice. Id. at 19–29. Borg-Barthet
contends that the same must therefore be true for the internal affairs rule.
225. Id. at 149–70.
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continuing criticisms of the internal affairs rule as applied in corporate
law 226 and the modified version of the internal affairs rules that California
and New York apply to pseudo-foreign corporations with strong ties to
those states. 227
While there are potential Commerce Clause objections to internal
affairs rules exceptions, 228 the issue certainly merits current consideration in
the field of LLC law. The use of LLCs as asset protection devices has raised
concerns, for example, about whether the internal affairs rule should apply
when creditors of LLC members obtain charging orders. 229 Moreover, while
state LLC acts are broadly similar across the country, many diverge
considerably on at least one critical issue: the extent to which participants in
an LLC may waive fundamental fiduciary duties when adopting or
amending the company’s operating agreement. 230 Delaware, unlike most
states, permits participants in LLCs to eliminate all fiduciary duty
protections. 231 For a U.S. jurisdiction that values fiduciary standards, a
modified internal affairs rule for pseudo-foreign LLCs—perhaps one
patterned on California’s or New York’s corporate choice-of-law rules, or
on the new internal affairs rule models that Borg-Barthet proposes for the
European Union—could protect the state’s LLC law on fiduciary duties
against incursions from Delaware or other jurisdictions with more lax
requirements.

226. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law,
67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2004).
227. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2010) (establishing a multi-part test to determine
whether a corporation’s dominant relationship is with California and providing that specific
provisions of the California Corporations Code will apply to such corporations); N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW §§ 1319–20 (McKinney 2012) (providing that certain New York rules on shareholder rights
and mergers are applicable to non-public corporations that conduct more than one-half of their
business income activities in New York).
228. Allmendinger, supra note 56, at 83 (noting that “the issue of whether the laws on pseudoforeign companies are constitutional under the Commerce Clause is . . . unresolved in legal
debate” and citing authorities).
229. See Jay D. Adkisson et al., Recent Developments in Charging Orders, BUS. L. TODAY,
Feb. 2013, at 1, 3 (stating that “[T]he courts are just beginning to scratch the conflicts-of-law
issues”).
230. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2013) (“to the extent that, at law or in equity, a . . .
manager . . . has duties (including fiduciary duties) to [the LLC] or [any] member . . . , [the]
manager’s . . . duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the [LLC
operating] agreement; provided, that the [LLC operating] agreement may not eliminate the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”).
231. See, e.g., Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After
More Than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 568 (2007) (“Some states contain
mandatory statutory standards, while others defer to the contractual provisions adopted by the
LLC members. The state of Delaware—long considered the most important jurisdiction in
developing business entity laws in the United States—has taken the lead in permitting not merely
the modification of default fiduciary duties, but their elimination by contract.”).
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Dean Vestal made a similar proposal in the field of partnership law
almost two decades ago. 232 Vestal’s analysis of the constitutional
dimensions of the internal affairs rule as applied to partnerships are likely
applicable to LLCs as well, 233 but we could also learn from Europe. The
Inspire Art case 234 may not have resolved all questions about the application
of real seat jurisdiction company laws to pseudo-foreign firms under the EU
treaty. And to the extent that EU charter provisions permit some regulation
of pseudo-foreign companies, an EU-U.S. comparison could be instructive.
Christoph Allmendinger, a legal expert from Germany, has recently
undertaken the task. He compares the extent to which U.S. and European
jurisdictions may regulate pseudo-foreign corporations under the
Commerce Clause and EU treaty, respectively, and concludes that as
compared to the EU charter, the U.S. constitutional framework may afford
states broader discretion to regulate such companies.235
There are doubtless other examples where comparative study of
European and U.S. business association laws will be productive. If scholars
and other students of comparative company law are to embark on such
inquiries, they would be well-advised to first relax the traditional scholarly
focus on competition and convergence of business association laws as the
inevitable byproduct of jurisdictional competition under the internal affairs
rule. May this Article mark a small first step in that direction.

232. Allan W. Vestal, Choice of Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Partners Under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 219 (1994).
233. Id. at 252–56 (describing potential constitutional objections to application of the internal
affairs rule to partnerships); id. at 261–64 (noting potential constitutional dimensions of the
internal affairs rule).
234. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
235. Allmendinger, supra note 56, at 67.

